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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background and Review of Previous Work 
Unlike most other nations, the United States has a dual banking 
system. A bank may be chartered either by the state banking authority 
In the state where the bank is formed or by the Comptroller of the 
Currency. Prior to the Banking Act of 1935, this encouraged instability 
in the banking system. The state banking authorities and the Comptrol­
ler of the Currency competed for banks by being as lenient in the re­
quirements as possible. It has been argued that this free and easy 
entry into the banking industry resulted in "excessive" competition 
and thus more bank failures than could be tolerated. The instability 
of the system prior to the Depression and the catastrophic number of 
failures during the early 1930's led to pressure for Congress to make 
the system more stable. The result was the passage of the Banking Act 
of 1935. 
Under the Banking Act, six factors must be considered in deter­
mining whether a charter for a national bank is to be issued. These 
factors are: 1) the financial history and condition of the bank; 
2) the adequacy of its capital structure; 3) its future earnings pros­
pects; 4) the general character of its management; 5) the convenience 
and needs of the community to be served by the bank; and 6) whether or 
not its corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of the Act 
[1].^  
A^ll bracketed numbers refer to references in the bibliography. 
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These six factors can be placed into two categories: worthiness 
and need. All but 3) and 5) fall into the worthiness category. The 
worthiness criterion is used to determine whether an applicant has the 
character and experience to operate a bank soundly and profitably. 
In satisfying this criterion, the potential banker is demonstrating 
the potential ability to operate a bank profitably and lawfully. 
Factors 3) and 5) can be classified as the need criterion. Here the 
potential entrant must show that there is enough growth in the desired 
market to profitably support another bank without hurting existing 
banks. 
These charter requirements have proved to be a substantial barrier 
to entry in banking. All national charter applicants are subject to 
these criteria. Additionally, all state charter applicants that apply 
for membership in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) are 
subject to these criteria. In some states, charter approval is contin­
gent on the receipt of FDIC insurance by the applicant. Most banks are 
insured by the FDIC. In 1974, 237 commercial banks out of a total of 
14,457 were not insured [5, January 1975, p. A82]. In examining the 
reasons given for the rejection of applications for new national banks 
and branches between 1941 and 1950, Shull and Horvitz found that the 
reason given for 53% of the rejections was "insufficient need" [31]. 
So, at least for national banks, the need criterion is the major reason 
for charter rejection. 
From the inception of the need criterion until 1970, the number of 
head office commercial banks in the United States declined fairly 
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steadily. The number of bank failures has remained at a low level 
since 1940. For example, changes in the number of bank suspensions 
has been below 10 In every year since 1940 [5, 1941-1975]. Many 
economists have argued that we are paying too high a price for reducing 
bank failure. That is, the charter requirements have succeeded not 
only in reducing the number of bank failures, but they have also reduced 
competition and sheltered the owners of commercial banks from competi­
tion. Alhadeff has argued that the need criterion is not a reliable 
way of controlling either competition or bank failure and that it 
would be better to eliminate this criterion and protect the public 
from failure directly [2]. He has also argued that there are serious 
barriers to entry for unit banks even without the charter requirements, 
eg. limit pricing by existing banks. Thus, he says, excessive competi­
tion will not occur in any case [1]. 
From 1935 until 1962, the number of commercial banks declined 
relatively steadily. The number of head office commercial banks 
rose from 1962 to 1964, then declined again until 1970. Since 1970, 
the number has-risen each year. In addition, the number of new banks 
has risen tremendously since 1970 [5, 1936-1975]. The difference 
between changes in the number of new banks and changes in the number 
of head office banks is due to such things as voluntary liquidations, 
suspensions, absorptions and consolidations. This increase in the 
number of new banks is a particularly strange phenomenon today given 
the rise in the number of bank failures and the general state of the 
economy. 
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The standard explanation for the increase is that merger activity 
has declined. The decline in merger activity is probably the result of 
the state of the economy in general and the state of the stock market 
in particular. With the general decline in stock prices, mergers have 
become less attractive. If mergers are less attractive, but branch, 
group, and chain banks want to continue to expand, the alternative is 
to seek new charters (group and chain banks) and permission for more 
branches (branch banks). The latter will not affect new bank statis­
tics. 
Some support for this argument can be obtained by looking at data 
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on absorptions and consolidations. Absorptions and consolidations 
are divided into two parts; banks converted into branches and other. 
As can be seen in Table 1, changes in both have declined since 1971, 
indicating a decline in merger activity. This should then be compared 
with banking organization activity. Data is available on branch banking 
activity. As can be seen in Table 1, both the number of head office 
branch banks and the number of branch offices continue to rise. 
Group and chain banks, both of which must acquire charters for 
new banks that they form, are also banking organizations. Since the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, group banks have been required to 
report the number of banks in the group [3]. So data on group banks 
are available since 1956. However, the definition of a bank holding 
2 Absorptions occur when one bank acquires another bank. In this 
case, the acquired bank becomes part of the remaining bank. With con­
solidations, two banks give up their charters and become one bank under 
a new charter. 
Table 1. Changes in banking structure from 1960-1974 [5, 1961-1975] 
Changes in Absorptions & Branch Banking Group Banking 
Consolidations 
Year Banks Converted 
into Branches 
Other Head Office 
Branch Banks 
Branches Group Bank 
Oreanizat ions 
Number of Banks/ 
Branches in Group 
1960 106 25 2329 10483 47 426/1037 
1961 126 13 2619 11353 46 427/1107 
1962 164 18 2484 12345 49 442/1215 
1963 139 12 2791 13498 52 454/1278 
1964 120 13 2966 14601 54 460/1379 
1965 130 19 3140 15756 53 468/1486 
1966 113 24 3313 16908 65 561/1807 
1967 114 19 3487 17928 74 603/2085 
1968 120 10 3665 19013 80 619/2262 
1969 128 18 3794 20208 97 723/2674 
1970 127 23 3994 21643 121 895/3260 
1971 83 13 4132 23104 not available not available 
1972 106 10 4395 24622 not available not available 
1973 87 10 4724 26454 251 1815/7513 
1974 105 13 5123 28244 276 2122/8887 
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Company was changed by the Bank Holding Company Amendment of 1970 [4]. 
Under the old definition, a bank holding company was defined as two or 
more banks held together by a holding company. After 1970, the defini­
tion became one or more banks held together by a holding company. How­
ever, in 1974 (1973 data), the Federal Reserve began to distinguish 
between one-bank and multi-bank holding companies. The data are pre­
sented in Table 1 and it is evident that group bank activity is rising. 
Chain banks (banks held together by other than a holding company) 
are not required to report their holding to the regulatory authorities. 
In some states, group banks are prohibited. Particularly if branch 
banking is prohibited or severely restricted and group banking is pro­
hibited, chain banking is the obvious alternative. While chain banking 
activity has almost certainly risen, there is no recent information 
3 
available on their activity and very little control over them. 
While a change in the level of merger activity is one of the 
reasons for a change in the number of head office banks, it is cer­
tainly not the entire explanation. There are two sides to the entry of 
a new bank into a market. Not only must a charter be demanded for 
entry to occur, but the chartering authority must also be willing to 
supply the charter. So any change in the number of head office banks 
must be explained not only by changes in demand, but also by changes 
in supply. Some work has been done on the demand for and supply of 
bank charters and bank entry. 
3 For about the only information available on chain banking, see 
[9], [10]. 
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Peltzman developed a model to determine the impact of regulation 
on entry into the banking industry. In bis model, the rate of new bank 
formation is a function of the intended (desired) values of changes in 
the capital stock and changes in the average capital size per bank, 
the rate of bank mergers, and the rate of bank failures. Since he is 
concerned with the impact of regulation on bank entry, he also includes 
a dummy variable to represent the effects of regulation, where effective 
regulation begins with the Banking Act of 1935. Peltzman estimates 
that entry restrictions have resulted in an entry rate that has been 
0.579% per year lower from 1936 to 1962. This amounts to a loss of 
2,200 new banks that would have been formed without the entry restric­
tions [26]. 
Orr looked at barriers to entry in banking as a method of pre­
dicting bank entry in Canada. He includes measures of capital require­
ments, economies of scale, product differentiation, past profits, past 
industry growth and concentration as explanatory variables. These 
barriers to entry, which explain entry or the lack of it in manufactur­
ing industries, do not explain the low rate of entry in banking. He 
concludes that the actual rate of entry, which is lower than the rate 
predicted by his model, can be attributed to the barriers created by 
Canada's Bank Act [25]. 
A third model to explain the number of new banks chartered was 
developed by Brown. He includes population, income, the ratio of 
Savings and Loan shares to commercial bank savings deposits, urbaniza­
tion, and dummy variables for unit banking, statewide branching and 
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limited area branching as independent variables. Since insufficient 
need is a major reason for rejecting an application, he attempted 
to quantify the need criterion in terms of these economic variables. 
While his model performed more satisfactorily when the number of 
persons per banking office was the dependent variable, he concludes 
that a better measure of the intensity of the utilization of banking 
services is needed [6]. 
Greenbaum and Ali developed a theoretical model to explain the 
equilibrium level of bank charters. Here the demand for bank charters 
is a function of the estimated profits associated with operating a 
bank. The supply of newly issued and extant charters equals the number 
of existing charters plus a proportion of current applications that is 
approved. Using a simple model of the market for bank charters, they 
suggest that banking profits can be used to control bank entry with 
the same effectiveness as the current methods, but with the added ad­
vantage of reducing the need for ad hoc administrative judgements [20]. 
Garrison looked at the effects of charter requirements on the 
timing of new bank entry. He maximizes the present value of the bank 
with respect to time, where the present value is a function of the 
initial costs of beginning operation and the net cash flow of the bank. 
The bank will begin operating at some point in time after the potential 
net cash flow becomes positive. The time period before the bank enters 
will be shorter, the smaller the initial costs of beginning operation, 
the lower the rate of interest, or the faster the community is growing 
[19]. 
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Using an aggregated microeconomic investment decision model, 
Nosari examined national bank entry. Desired national bank entry, 
measured by the number of unit bank applications the Comptroller of 
the Currency receives, is explained by the rate of return and risk 
in banking, the rate of return and risk in a combination asset, 
aggregate real wealth, and dummy variables representing the terms of 
the Comptrollers of the Currency from 1936 to 1968. He concludes 
that the expected rate of return in banking, the expected rate of re­
turn in the alternative Investment, and regulatory attitudes all play 
a significant role in explaining desired bank entry [24]. 
All of these papers deal in one way or. another with the impact of 
controls on bank entry. From these papers, it is evident that the 
regulations set down in the Banking Act of 1935 have been effective 
in restricting entry into the banking industry. However, how the 
banking authorities measure "need" is still not clear. 
Two other articles, both dealing with dual banking and the result­
ing inequities in the laws, should be mentioned here. Bedford discusses 
the history of the dual banking system and the reasons for its survival. 
He goes on to discuss the benefits of being a nationally chartered bank. 
These benefits include exemption from state "doing business" and "blue-
sky" laws in out-of-state transactions, exemption from some other state 
taxes, and supervision and examination by only one supervisory agency 
rather than the two to which most state banks are subject. His conclu­
sion is that it is history rather than logic that explains the dual 
banking system of the United States today [30]. 
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Mille also discusses the inequities of the dual banking system as 
it presently exists. He points to the potential advantages of state 
regulation, such as the ability of states to better design laws and 
regulations to meet local and regional needs, but acknowledges that 
many state banking systems have failed in these areas. He discusses 
the burdens imposed on state banks by dual examinations and the need 
to obtain approval from two agencies for mergers and branches. Also 
mentioned are the differing interpretations of the law by the Comptrol­
ler of the Currency and the Federal Reserve and the differential taxa­
tion of national banks. He concludes that state banking agencies 
should be given more power and that some of the inequities should be 
eliminated [34]. 
Both of these articles stress the importance of national bank 
exemption from the "doing business" and "blue-sky" laws in their out-of-
state transactions in encouraging large banks to be nationally char­
tered. Public Law 91-156 amended 12 U.S.C. 548 in 1969. Section 1(a) 
of this law states that a national bank headquartered in a state is 
subject to the same taxes as state banks headquartered in the state, 
with the exception of taxes on intangible personal property until Janu­
ary 1, 1972. Section 2, which was to become effective on January 1, 
1972, permits states to tax national banks not headquartered in the 
state on the same basis as out-of-state state banks are taxed. Also 
permitted is the taxation of intangible personal property and of 
dividends received on shares of stock of national banks to the extent 
that state banks are so taxed. Section 2 was amended by Public Law 
lia 
92-213 so that it became effective on January 1, 1973 rather than on 
January 1, 1972. These amendments eliminated the preferential tax 
treatment of national banks both in the state in which they are 
headquartered and in their out-of-state transactions. The out-of-state 
transactions taxation to which national banks would then be liable was 
of great concern to bankers and to the Congress. It would potentially 
raise the tax liabilities of national banks substantially. In 1973, 
Congress passed Public Law 93-100, which forbids states to impose any 
"doing business" taxes on any insured depository not headquartered in 
the state until January 1, 1976.^  Congress is currently considering a 
further extension. So today neither state nor national banks are 
subject to "doing business" taxes in their out-of-state transactions 
as long as they are insured banks. 
B. Statement of the Problem 
None of the previous work has dealt specifically with the supply 
of and demand for new bank charters. The work by Peltzman, Orr, and 
Brown deals with entry into the banking industry, which is distinct 
from the demand for bank charters. The work by Greenbaum and Ali deals 
with the equilibrium level of bank charters in a theoretical framework. 
Nosari does look at the demand for bank charters. However, he deals 
only with national applications in a time series model and the results 
are not particularly strong. Both Redford and Wille list the advantages 
_ 
For a more complete history and reading of these laws, see [3?^  
pp. 393-394]. 
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and disadvantages of state and national affiliation, but in neither 
case is a model developed or tested. 
In this paper, I will attempt to carry this work a step further 
by developing models, to be tested with cross-sectional data, to 
explain the demand for and supply of both state and national charters 
and to explain the choice made by the applicants between state and 
national charters. 
The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, the factors that 
influence the decision to apply for a bank charter will be examined. 
Charter applications are more prevalent in some areas of the country 
than in others. This is probably due to a combination of economic and 
regulatory factors. Economic factors would include such variables as 
the profitability of banks in a particular area and the growth in popu­
lation and income in the area. A major regulatory factor might be the 
branch banking laws of the state. If we accept the premise that more 
independent banks in a market will make that market more competitive. 
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then we need to know if the factors that play a major role in determin­
ing the number of charter applications received are primarily economic 
or primarily regulatory. If the primary determinants are economic, the 
regulatory authorities can do little to encourage entry. If, however, 
the primary determinants are regulatory, then the regulations should 
be re-examined to determine whether or not the benefits from the regula­
tion are outweighed by the cost of reduced competition in banking 
markets. 
Second, the demand for state bank charters will be compared to the 
demand for national bank charters. After a potential banker has decided 
to enter a market, he must decide between applying for a state bank 
charter and a national bank charter. Since the relative costs and 
benefits of the two types of charters are different, these must be 
weighed in the decision. Because both the state and national banking 
authorities are concerned with the number of banks under their juris­
diction and with charter-switching, the relative importance of the 
economic and regulatory factors involved in determining which route is 
chosen should be important to them. 
Third, the supply of charters, which is the final step in the 
chartering process, will be examined. Once the regulatory authority 
receives an application, it must determine whether the application 
satisfies the worthiness and need criteria (meets the price) that the 
regulatory authority has set as its minimum standard. A substantial 
percentage of charter applications are rejected, which indicates that 
many potential bankers misjudge the price that the regulatory authority 
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has set. Here again, if the goal is a stable, but competitive, banking 
system, the costs and benefits of the factors that are the primary 
reasons for rejection should be re-examined. 
In this paper it is assumed that an increase in the number of banks 
in a market will make that market more competitive. This is a debat­
able assumption. There have been numerous attempts in the literature 
to link concentration to bank performance and the results have not been 
conclusive. For example, see [18], [27], [32]. There are really two 
questions here. The first is whether or not the number of banks in a 
market or the level of concentration is related to bank performance. 
When this has been the question being asked, the answer has not been 
clear. Part of the reason for the uncertainty is based on problems 
with the models and measures of performance and concentration. Anotner 
part of the reason is that if there is a relationship, it Is probably 
discrete rather than continuous [21, p. 1392]. The second question 
is whether or not entry of a new bank has an immediate Impact on 
performance. D.R. Fraser and P.S. Rose found in one study of entry 
into isolated markets that there was a positive Impact on performance. 
However, they could not say whether this was a long-run effect [18]. 
Chapter II of this paper is a discussion of the theoretical model 
for each of tlia three questions. Ixi Chapter III the statistical tech­
nique and data used art; explained, as well as the empirical models. 
Chapter IV contains the results and Chapter V is the conclusion. 
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II. THEORETICAL MODEL 
A. Introduction 
Bank charters are not homogeneous products, since there are differ­
ences in the costs and benefits of charters obtained from alternative 
sources. For any particular entrant, there are two sources: The Comp­
troller of the Currency and the state banking authority in the state in 
which that bank would be headquartered. While these charters are sub­
stitutes, they are not perfect substitutes. So for the nation as a 
whole, there are fifty-one slightly different charters that are provid­
ed, one for each state and the national charter. While there is some 
competition between each state and the Comptroller of the Currency, it 
is minimized by the constraint of FDIC insurance. The main result of 
this competition is that archaic laws and rules are probably removed 
more rapidly than if there were only one chartering authority. There 
appears to be little active price competition between the state and 
national authorities. That is, the chartering authorities no longer 
compete for banks by being lenient in their regulations governing both 
charter approvals and existing banks. This is to be expected since the 
major goal of the charter regulations is to minimize the failure rate, 
given an adequate level of banking services, by restricting entry. 
Thus, for any specific location for a new bank, the applicant faces a 
duopoly and Loth members of the duopoly are failure minimizers. 
In addition, there are three sorts of charter applications: 
applications for primary organizations, applications for charter con­
versions, and applications to be issued pursuant to corporate 
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reorganizations. Much more Information is available to the chartering 
authorities with the latter two cases since the bank already exists 
at the time the application is made. So the weights given to the supply 
variables may differ in each of the three instances. Also, the reasons 
for making the application may be different in each case. For example, 
the factors considered in a corporate reorganization will differ from 
those considered in the decision to open a new bank. In this paper, 
I will deal only with the demand for and the supply of charters for 
primary organizations in both the state and national markets. It 
should be understood then that the discussion of charters that follows 
refers only to charters for primary organizations. 
The process by which equilibrium is reached in each submarket can 
be viewed as follows. The first step in the process is that the price 
of the charter is set by the chartering authority. The price is a 
function of the six factors that must be considered in reviewing any 
charter application and it is set to minimize the probability that the 
new bank will fail. While there is surely some trade-off between 
factors, there is some minimum below which no factor can fall. For 
example, higher expected future net returns may to some extent offset 
a lower level of management expertise. But there is some minimum 
level of expertise that must be attained in order for a charter to be 
granted. The applicant could acquire more expertise by paying more, 
but if the cost is sufficiently high, the price cannot be met. So 
there can be instances where the applicant cannot meet the price under 
any circumstances. 
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Once the price is set, potential bankers determine whether or not 
they can meet the price. In doing this, the potential applicant must 
determine if a bank will be profitable, given the regulations of the 
chartering authority, and if so, to which authority the application 
will be submitted. Part of the price of the charter is tangible, but 
a large part is not. For example, the precise measure of the need for 
a new bank in an area is not known to the potential banker. So the 
price the banker views, and thus the expected value he calculates, is 
a subjective value. Thus there is an element nf risk involved. Since 
the applicant does not know with certainty whether he has met the 
price set by the chartering authority, he may incur the cost of 
applying for a charter without actually receiving one. The only way 
for the potential banker to ascertain whether he has correctly gauged 
the requirements of the chartering authority is to submit an applica­
tion. 
In the third and final step, the charter is reviewed by the 
chartering authority, which independently evaluates the application 
in terms of the six factors. At this stage, one of three things may 
occur. The charter application will either be approved or rejected, 
or it will be withdrawn by the applicant. As charter applications 
are approved and rejected, this information is fed back to other 
potential bankers who are preparing applications. 
B. Demand for Bank Charters 
Ownership of a bank is one of numerous investment opportunities. 
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The decision to pursue the bank ownership alternative will be based 
on aa assessment of the return and risk in banking relative to the 
other investment opportunities that are available. We will assume that 
the investor has made the decision to consider the bank ownership 
alternative. 
If there were no regulatory restrictions on entry into the banking 
industry, the decision to form a bank would be based solely on the 
expected rate of return and risk in banking. That is, the investor 
would calculate the expected value obtained from forming a bank in a 
particular location as follows; 
(1) EV = / dt 
t=t^  (1+k) (1+k) o 
The discounted expected value of operating the bank is given by EV. The 
discounted stream of expected after-tax earnings of the bank is repre­
sented by f [R /(l+k)^ ]dt. One would expect this stream of earnings 
t"to t 
to rise rapidly at first and then more slowly as the bank continues in 
operation. The discount factor, k, includes both the required risk-free 
rate of return and the risk factor. The initial costs of beginning 
operation, Kc^ , includes the initial capitalization, advertising, and 
set-up costs and is a decision variable. Entry occurs at time t^ . In 
this case, entry will occur when and if the expected value of operating 
the bank is positive. 
Nonregulatory barriers to entry might still prevent the optimal 
number of banks from operating in a market. Whether or not this occurs 
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will depend on how important the nonregulatory barriers are. That is, 
the greater is the competitive advantage of existing banks, the lower 
will be the entry rate. While the precise competitive advantage of 
existing banks is not known, the advantage will surely vary with 
different market structures. These nonregulatory barriers will be 
reflected in the expected after-tax earnings of the new bank and the 
initial cost of beginning operation. 
The charter requirement is designed to restrict entry into banking 
in order to minimize bank failures. Because entry is restricted, 
existing banks are in varying degrees sheltered from competition. The 
degree of shelter depends on the number of bank and nonbank alternatives 
in the market. This shelter should have a positive implicit value for 
the owner of a charter. One means of taxing away at least part of this 
value, while restricting entrj', would be for the chartering authorities 
to charge an explicit price for the charter. The price would be chosen 
to maintain the entry rate deemed desirable by the chartering authority. 
By raising or lowering the price, the chartering authority lowers or 
raises the entry rate. In this case, the expected value of the bank 
would be calculated as follows: 
(2) EV - s" r dt °—— 
t=t^  (1+k) (1+k) o 
The price of the charter, P^ , then is an additional initial cost that 
the potential entrant must consider. At any time, this price is known. 
Because entry is restricted, the discount factor, k, would be lower than 
in the previous case, since the risks in operating the bank should be 
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lower. Again, entry occurs when the expected value is positive. 
In this second case, entry is restricted by the chartering 
authority through the price mechanism. If the applicant is willing 
to pay the price set by the chartering authority, the charter will be 
granted. However, part, but not necessarily all, of the benefit to the 
owner of a charter accrues to the chartering authority. 
While the above two cases are ways in which the system could 
conceivably be constructed,•neither represents the actual situation. In 
reality, the applicant knows that entry is restricted by the chartering 
authority, but does not know precisely how it is done. That is, "the 
convenience and needs of the community" is the mechanism used to re­
strict entry. But, unlike the explicit price of the second case, there 
is no way for the applicant to guarantee receipt of a charter. 
Because the future cannot be predicted with perfect accuracy, the 
expected value of forming a bank in a particular market will always 
include an element of uncertainty. However, there is an additional 
element of uncertainty under the present system. The applicant must 
also consider the probability of obtaining a charter. While the 
probability can to some extent be controlled by the applicant, the 
applicant can never be completely certain of obtaining the charter. 
Thus, two possibilities exist. If the applicant does obtain the 
charter, the value that accrues to the owner is: 
Here includes not only the initial capitalization, advertising and 
(3) 
t=t^  (1+k) t 
o 
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set-up costs, but also the application costs, and the costs of 
acquiring the information that is presented to the authority, Ig^ . 
Equation 3 shows the expected value if the charter is obtained. 
However, If the applicant does not obtain the charter, the negative 
value that accrues to the applicant is the money that was spent in 
applying for the charter: 
(4) EV. he S^C 
(l+k)^ o 
Given that two possible returns exist and that the applicant can 
assign a subjective probability to each of them, the expected value of 
the charter can be written as: 
R 
(5) EV ; 
t=t (l+k)*^  
•dt 
(l+k)^ o 
P- A^C S^C 
(1+k)^ o 
(1-P) 
The probability of obtaining the charter (the probability of success) 
is represented by P. 
The probability of obtaining a charter is a function of five 
variables: the level of capitalization, the application costs, 
I^ C» the search costs, Ig^ , the response of existing banks to entry, 
BR; and the attitude of the chartering authority, CA. The first three 
variables are controlled by the applicant; they are decision variables. 
The higher the level of initial capitalization, the greater will be the 
probability of success, the rationale being that the potential bank thus 
has a larger base from which to begin operations, and so is regarded as 
safer by the chartering authority. With regard to the second variable, 
the more money that is spent preparing the application package, eg. 
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including photographs of the desired location, including survey infor­
mation, etc., the greater will be the probability of success. The 
third method of raising the probability is to do market studies, hire 
experts to testify, etc. in order to make a more convincing case before 
the chartering authority. It should be noted that all three methods 
result in higher initial costs to the applicant. Thus, some trade-off 
between higher initial costs and the probability of obtaining the 
charter exists. The relationships between the three decision variables 
and the probability of obtaining a charter are depicted graphically in 
Table 2. 
The probability of obtaining the charter cannot be completely 
controlled by the applicant. For given levels of the three decision 
variables, the response of existing banks to the threat of entry and 
the attitude of the chartering authority will determine the probability 
of obtaining the charter. That is, for given levels of the decision 
variables, the more negative the response of existing banks, i.e. the 
more counter-evidence they produce, and the more the chartering author­
ity wants to restrict entry, the lower will be the probability of 
success. 
Writing the probability of obtaining a charter as a function of 
the five ^ 'ariables that have been specified and substituting this into 
equation 5, we have: 
Table 2. The relationships between the probability of obtaining a charter and the 
decision variables 
0 . 0  
P 
1.0 1.0 
0 . 0  0 . 0  
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(6) EV = Qt -
t=tg (1+k) (1+k) ""o 
\c '*' ^ 5C 
(l+k)'o 
((1%. IAC> isc' 
[1- f(V Iac he-  CA): 
The applicant will then maximize the expected value of the charter 
by choosing the appropriate values of the three decision variables, I^ , 
and Igç. In order to complete the maximization problem and obtain 
answers that are consistent with reality, four constraints must be 
included: (i) 0 < fflg, Ig^ , BR, CA) < 1 
(ii) 1% > 0 
(iii) > 0 
(iv) Igg > 0 
The first constraint states that the probability of obtaining a charter 
ranges from zero to less than one. That is, the applicant will never 
be completely certain of obtaining a charter. The last three con­
straints are needed to avoid nonsense results. They state that the 
applicant can never spend negative sums of money on the decision 
variables. 
It should be noted that there may be a positive relationship 
between the expected after-tax earnings of the bank and the initial 
capitalization, I^ . For simplicity, we have ignored this relationship, 
although it could certainly be incorporated. 
Because the constraints are inequalities, nonlinear programming 
must be employed to solve the maximization problem. Only the last 
three constraints listed above are relevant to the problem. The first 
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constraint involves specifying the probability function correctly. 
That is, by definition the probability must lie between zero and one. 
Multiplying through equation 6, we can restate the problem as maximize: 
R. 
(7) EV = < / 
It=t^  (1+k) 




(l+k)^ o (l+k)^ o 
subject to: (i) 
("> 
(iii) Isc 1 0 
The Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for a global maximum are: 
I 
(8) SEV 91 




'AC isc' , 0. > 0, Ig • = 0 




t=t^  (1+k) 





0' lAc 0 
9EV 





t=tg (1+k) (1+k) o 
' a c - °  
he 'SC-
31 SC 
 ^^ °.'sc^ °. If 
(1+k) o SC 
Igc = 0 
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For all three marginal conditions, if the first partial is negative, 
then additional amounts of that decision variable reduce the expected 
value and thus the optimum amount of that decision variable would be 
zero. If the amount of the decision variable is positive, then the 
first partial will be zero at the maximum. Thus, we can rewrite the 
Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for a global maximum as: 
(11) < 0, I. > 0, and I. • = 0 where i = K, AC, SC 
X X 
That is, for the optimal solution for each decision variable, either 
the marginal condition holds as an equality, or the decision variable 
takes the value zero or both. The Kuhn-Tucker sufficient conditions 
for a global maximum will hold if in addition to the necessary condi­
tions stated above, the right hand side of equation 7 is differentiable 
5 
and concave in the nonnegative orthant. 
C. Choosing Between National ard State Charters 
Once it has been determined that a bank would be profitable, the 
applicant must choose between applying for a state charter and a 
national charter. The applicant calculates the relative profitability 
under each charter and chooses the one which is the most profitable. 
That is, the applicant calculates the expected value of a state 
chartered bank and compares that with the expected value of a nationally 
chartered bank, choosing the charter with the higher expected value. 
F^or a proof of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, see [7, pp. 704-728]. 
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Several variables, which vary between state and national charters, 
enter into the calculation. The most obvious is the reserve require­
ment which is a cost to the bank since these are nonincome-earning 
assets. The effective reserve requirement for state nonmember banks is 
usually lower than for national banks and for state banks that join the 
Federal Reserve system. Even when the percentages are the same or are 
higher for a state bank, the effective rate Is generally lower for two 
reasons. First, state banks are usually allowed to count respondent 
balances as part of their required reserves. While these are nonincome-
earning assets, the bank will hold some respondent balances whether 
they are part of reserves or not, so counting them as reserves reduces 
the nonincome-earning assets the bank must hold. Second, in many 
states part of the state bank's reserves may be held in the form of 
highly liquid income-earning assets, such as Treasury bills, again 
reducing the nonincome-earning assets of the bank. Particularly 
when money is tight and Interest rates are high, reserve requirements 
will be an important part of any decision and will have an impact on 
the profitability of the bank. 
A second consideration is the examination cost or supervision 
fee assessed to a bank. State banks are examined by two regulatory 
authorities, the state banking authority and the FDIC, whereas national 
banks are only examined by the Comptroller of the Currency. So in 
states where examination costs are assessed or where there is an annual 
supervision fee, state banks will be paying fees to two authorities. 
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Additionally, state banks, because they are examined by two authorities, 
will have their normal operations interrupted more frequently than 
national banks. 
Location and size may also be important. Rural banks and smaller 
banks will be more dependent on the correspondent mechanism for such 
things as check-clearing and borrowing to meet reserve deficiencies. 
State nonmember banks cannot borrow at the discount window. The 
importance of this service is debatable since the majority of banks 
never use the service. For example, "...only 63 banks (less than 15% 
of all members) borrowed from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
in 1966, a year of wide swings in monetary conditions" [25, p.63]. 
However, this figure may be much higher now. In addition, the 
ability to borrow, even though it may never be used, may be important 
to the banker. To the extent that the correspondent mechanism offers 
the same services as the Federal Reserve system and at a lower price, 
a state charter will have a higher expected value. 
Bank holding company and branch banking activity may also have an 
Impact on the expected value of the bank under the different charters. 
It may be that the initial size of the entering bank must be larger to 
compete effectively with these organizations. A larger initial size 
will result in a different expected value. 
A final criterion will be the probability of the charter applica­
tion being approved. In some states, the state banking authority works 
closely with applicants and thus is in a position to effectively dis­
courage the submission of applications that would eventually be rejected. 
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An applicant in this situation will have more information available to 
it as to whether an application should be submitted to the state author­
ity. In some regions of the country, this is also true for national 
charters. In other states and regions, much more uncertainty is attach­
ed to the probability of obtaining a charter. Since there are costs in 
preparing the charter application and if the charter is rejected these 
costs are not offset by any gain, the applicant must take account of the 
likelihood of the charter being approved. 
D. Supply of Bank Charters 
As was noted previously, the goal of the chartering authority is 
to minimize bank failure within the constraint that there is an adequate 
level of banking services available. This is accomplished in two ways, 
through periodic examination of existing banks and through entry 
restrictions. We are concerned with the second aspect. The supply of 
bank charters then depends on the number and quality of applications 
submitted to the chartering authority and the number of banks felt by 
the chartering authority to be optimal for a particular market. So an 
application will be approved if it meets two criteria. First, there 
must be a need for another bank in the market. Second, the applicant 
must meet the standard that will result in its probable survival. 
Approval of an application results only when both criteria are met. 
The chartering authority can influence the number of applications 
it receives over time both by verbal statements and actions. However, 
the chartering authority does not recruit applicants per se. That is, 
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whether more banking services are needed in a particular market will 
not be known to the chartering authority until an application from 
that market is received. So, the supply of new charters at any time 
will be some percentage of the demand for new charters: 
(12) = aD^  
where: = supply of bank charters at time t 
= applications received during time t and applications 
pending from time t-1 
a = percentage of applications that are approved, 
0 £ a j< 100 
Within the constraint of the applications before them, the chartering 
authorities can allow the supply of charters to vary from approval 
of all to approval of none. The percentage of applications that is 
approved, a, depends on the need for more banking services in the . 
markets from which applications are received and the worthiness of the 
applicants. 
Looking at a specific application, both of these criteria can be 
subsumed in the calcrilation of the expected value of the potential 
bank by the chartering authority: 
(13) EV = dt - ° . 
t=t^  (1+k)^  (1+k) o 
where these variables are as defined previously. The values that the 
chartering authority uses to calculate the expected after-tax return 
for the potential bank will depend on market conditions, the state of 
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existing banks, and the worthiness of the particular applicant. Since 
the chartering authority will not be gathering much information on 
market conditions independently, it will necessarily rely on the infor­
mation presented to it by the applicant and by existing banks. The 
worthiness criterion manifests itself in several ways. For example, 
whether or not the applicant has been able to hire sufficient numbers 
of adequately trained personnel for upper-level management positions 
will in part determine the expected after-tax return. 
In addition, the discount factor, k, used by the chartering 
authority may be greater than that used by the applicant. The 
chartering authority may view banking as riskier than the applicant 
views it. The applicant knows it will have the regulatory authorities 
to rely on in case of trouble. This reduces the risk that the appli­
cant alone must bear. The chartering authority, on the other hand, 
wants to minimize the probability of the bank becoming a problem and 
so may set the risk factor higher. 
The proposed initial capitalization, is determined by the 
applicant and may be above the minimum set by statute or law. An 
application that does not meet the minimum level of initial capitaliza­
tion will be automatically rejected. Since this is public information, 
one would not expect any application to fall into this category. 
In this case we are dealing with a single application from a 
particular market. Approval occurs when the expected value is positive. 
The second case that must be considered arises when more than one 
application for a particular market is received by the chartering 
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authority. It may be that the number of acceptable applicants is 
greater than the number of new banks the market can handle. Then the 
question before the chartering authority is which of the applications 
will be approved. 
The first step in this process is to calculate the expected value 
of each potential bank independently. Some applications may be elimi­
nated at this stage. The second step is to rank the remaining applica­
tions according to the calculated expected value of the bank. It 
should be noted that there will be differences among applications, such 
as differences in proposed Initial capitalizations, that will result in 
different expected values being calculated. The application having the 
highest expected value is then approved. Up to this point, the process 
is similar to dealing with mutually exclusive projects. That is, the 
alternative yielding the highest discounted return is chosen. However, 
the similarity ends here, because the market may be able to handle more 
than one new bank. So once the first bank is chosen, the expected 
values of the other proposed banks are recalculated taking the new en­
trant into consideration. Again, applications are ranked. The process 
continues as long as there is room in the market for an additional 
bank, i.e. until the expected values of the remaining applications 
become negative. 
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III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A. Statistical Technique 
We are concerned here with why potential banks fall into particu­
lar categories. The three areas of concern are; 
1) why applications are received from some market areas and 
not from others 
2) why applicants choose state or national affiliation 
3) what criteria determine which applications will be approved 
and rejected 
Because we want to classify the observations in each case into 
one of two groups, the statistical technique to be employed is 
discriminant analysis. The purpose of discriminant analysis is to 
determine the index number, based on a linear combination of the 
explanatory variables, which will best differentiate between the two 
groups.^  Given that there are k groups with observations in group 
k, N total observations and p variables, the key assumptions made are: 
1) each of the k groups has a multivariate normal distribution 
with respect to the variables, x^ ...x^  
2) the means of the x's among the k groups are different 
3) the variances and covariances of the x's among the k groups 
are equal 
Given these assumptions, the objective of discriminant analysis 
is to find a linear combination of the p variables which will best 
For a more complete discussion of discriminant analysis, see 
[8, pp. 243-261]. 
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discriminate between the groups. That is: 
(14) Y = X X + X X + X X + ... + X X il i. I 5 5 pp 
where: Y =» the value of the linear combination of the 
p variables 
X,...X = the coefficients of the p variables in the 
1 p 
linear combination 
X ,  . . . X  = the variables used for discrimination 
1 P 
Since we are dealing with two groups, k = 2, there will be one 
discriminant function. 
Discriminant analysis is then used to choose the X coefficients 
which make Y the best index for differentiating between members of the 
groups. So in the two group case, the .\'s are chosen to maximize the 
square of the difference between the means of the linearly transformed 
variables per unit of their variance. 
(15) 
a y 
where: n _ = mean of Y for group 1 
~ mean of Y for group 2 
2 
= variance of Y (pooled) 
Once the X's are chosen, a Y value may be computed for a particular 
observation. If the Y value exceeds the general mean of the two groups, 
that observation is allocated to the group with the higher mean. If the 
Y value is less, the observation is allocated to the group having the 
lower mean. 
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Two kinds of tests are then used to test the resulting function. 
First, one can test the discriminating power of the entire discriminant 
function using the Wilks' lambda statistic. The null hypothesis for 
this test is: 
(16) = w for k = 1, 2 
If the null hypothesis is accepted, then the explanatory variables do 
not discriminate among the groups. The Wilks' lambda statistic is 
defined as; 
2 Nv 
I vu I 
where is the dependent vector variable for the i observation in 
the k*"^  group and is the mean vector for the k^  ^sample. 
The Rao F-Ratio, which yields an approximate test of the signifi­
cance of the Wilks' lambda, is actually used to test the null hypothesis 
of no difference between the groups. The Rao F-Ratio is; 
(18) 1 - y ms + 2A. 
y 2r 
7 2  9  9  1  /?  
where: s = [ (p q - 4)/(p+q-5)] q = k- l 
m = n- (p+q + l)/2 n = N- l 
X=-(pq-2)/4 N = total number of observations 
r = pq/2 k = number of groups 
y=xl/2 p = number of variables 
The degrees of freedom are 2r and mx + 2A. 
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Second, one can perform tests of the significance of individual 
variables. One possibility is to use the Student's t-test. The 
problem with applying this test to a discriminant function is in 
measuring the variance of the coefficients of the discriminant function. 
To eliminate this problem, one can calculate the asymptotic variance 
of the coefficients. This will yield consistent estimates of the 
variance when the sample size is large. The t-statistic, that was used, 
tests for differences between the two group means for each variable. It 
is not the Student's t-test, but only tests whether assumption 2 on page 
32 holds. The t-statistic is: 
(X. -X.) 
(19) t = ^  ^
The degrees of freedom are - 2. 
Ni , 
where: X. = S X /N for the variable over group i, N. 
k=l 
is the sample size of group i 
1/2 
(SD)^  
N 2 i^ 2 \ ^ Xik - ( : 
k^=.l k=l 
• Cd.f.)^  
deviation with d.f. =• - 1 
is the standard 
S^  = [df^ (SD)J + dfj(SD)j}/[d.f.^  + d.f.j] is the 
pooled estimate of the variance with (d.f.)^  + 
(d.f.)j = WU + Nj - 2 
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S^ (N^  + N^ ) 
is the estimate of the standard 
error 
Another way of examining the relative importance of the various 
variables is to use the standardized discriminant weights on each of 
the variables. These weights are obtained by multiplying the discrimi­
nant function by the square roots of the diagonal of the covariance 
matrix within classes. These weigihts show the relative contributions 
of the input variables to the discriminant function. 
An alternative approach is to measure individuals against the 
previously determined groups in order to determine probable group 
membership. The underlying assumption is that a group is totally 
described by its mean and dispersion and that the relationship of the 
2 individual observation to the group is determined by a x which indi­
cates how many members of the group are farther from the mean than 
that member, and a Bayesian probability of membership in the group 
2 based on this X • For each observation, the probability of membership 
in group k is given by: 
(20) p(k) = P^ k^)/P2 
where: Pg = EP^ Ckj/Pg 
R = ratio of the group sample size to the determinant 
of the reduced dispersion matrix for group k 
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This is particularly useful in a practical situation. The observations 
in each sample for which low probabilities were calculated could then 
be re-examined to determine if some additional criteria could be 
included to better identify them. 
B. Nature of the Data 
Cross-sectional data were used for this study. It was felt that 
a cross-sectional study was preferred to a time series study for two 
reasons. First, charter applications tend to be concentrated in partic­
ular areas of the country, with a cross-sectional study, these areas 
could be delimited and data for these areas alone could be utilized. 
Second, preliminary work in a time series framework with aggregate data 
did not yield particularly promising results. Because data on applica­
tions received in a particular year were not available in published 
form, these data were obtained by sending a questionnaire to the state 
banking authorities in each of the fifty states and by writing to the 
Comptroller of the Currency. The questionnaire is presented in 
Appendix A. The state banking authorities in forty-five states and the 
Comptroller of the Currency responded to the request. 
Given the information obtained from these sources, the market 
area for each application was defined as either 1) the Standard Metro­
politan Statistical Area (SMSA), as defined by the Census Bureau, or 
2) the county when the application was outside an SMSA. One could 
argue that the marked area under this definition will be too large. 
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particularly in unit banking states. However, it is the smallest 
market area for which much of the data were available. For the demand 
model, the Individual observations were SMSAs. For the other two 
models, the individual observations were identified by the Census 
Bureau SMSA or county, the FDIC SMSA, bank holding company affiliation 
(dummy variable) and the proposed initial capital stock. 
It was deemed desirable to have the data be as recent as possible 
for this study. 1973 was the latest year for which some of the data 
could be obtained and so this study utilizes data for 1973. The sources 
for these data are explained in the following sections. 
C. Demand for Bank Charters 
In order to test the model of the demand for bank charters, 
proxies must be chosen to represent the expected after-tax return and 
the probability of obtaining the charter. Beginning with the variables 
that represent the expected after-tax return, let; 
R 
(21)  ^= f(POP, URB, RS, CEP, PROF, LD, DPROF, dUSB/dt, 
(1+^ ) dRS/dt, dDEP/dt, dPROF/dt, dLD/dt) 
where POP = population per banking office, 1973 
URB = population per square mile, 1973 
RS = retail sales level, 1973 
DEP = total deposits of existing banks, 1973 
PROF = net income as a percentage of the capital account 
for existing banks, 1973 
LD = ratio of total loans to total deposits of existing 
banks, 1973 
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DPROF = average return in manufacturing - average return in 
banking, 1973 
dURB/dt = percentage change in population per square mile 
from 1970 to 1975 
dRS/dt = percentage change in retail sales from 1971 to 1973 
dDEP/dt = percentage change in total deposits from 1972 to 1973 
dPROF/dt = percentage change in net income as a percentage of 
the capital account from 1972 to 1973 
dLD/dt = percentage change in the loan to deposit ratio 
from 1972 to 1973 
The expected after-tax return in a market area depends in part 
on the population in that area. This relationship is not precise, 
since one could find instances where a large population is not able 
to demand many banking services. However, one would expect in general 
that a larger population demands more banking services and thus the 
expected after-tax return should be higher. The population figures 
were obtained from Rand McNally's 1973 Commercial Atlas and Marketing 
Guide. These are population estimates. The data on banking offices 
was obtained from the FDIC publication Summary of Accounts and Deposits 
in all Commercial Banks and Mutual Savings Banks - National Summary, 
June 30, 1973. 
Density is being used to measure the degree of urbanization, URB. 
As the density of an area rises, one would expect the demand for 
banking services within that area to rise and thus the expected after­
tax return should be higher. The population figures and square miles 
were obtained from Rand McNally's 1975 Commercial Atlas and Marketing 
Guide. The estimated 1975 population was used in this calculation 
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since it is the future in which the potential applicant is interested. 
To some extent population figures from the near past are a valid measure 
of what could be expected to occur in the near future. But, since 
population estimates are readily available, one would expect the 
potential applicant to utilize them. 
Retail trade and changes in the level of it are also measures of 
the wealth of a market area. While it would have been desirable to 
have a more comprehensive figure for business activity, retail trade 
figures were the only ones available for off-census years. As the 
level of trade rises, the wealth of the market area will rise through 
the activity generated by the increased trade. Again this should 
cause a rise in desired banking services and thus in the expected 
after-tax return of the bank. These data were obtained from Rand 
McNally's 1973 Commercial Atlas and Marketing Guide and 1975 Commercial 
Atlas and Marketing Guide. 
The level of total deposits of existing banks and changes in that 
level also measure the need for banking services. Thus, increases in 
the level of total deposits should have a positive impact on the ex­
pected after-tax return of the potential bank. These data were 
obtained from the FDIC publications. Summary of Accounts and Deposits 
in all Commercial Banks and Mutual Savings Banks - National Summary, 
June 30, 1973 and Summary of Accounts and Deposits in all Commercial 
Banks - Regional Summaries, June 30, 1972. 
The profit rate of existing banks is a measure of the desirability 
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of entry. High profits or positive changes in the profit rate should 
encourage entry and have a positive impact on the expected after-tax 
return of the potential bank. However, to the extent that existing 
banks resist entry more vehemently when profits are high and rising, 
entry will be discouraged. So, no sign will be assigned a priori to 
the coefficients on these variables. Net income as a percentage of 
the capital account, from Table D of the 1972 and 1973 editions of the 
FDIC publication Bank Operating Statistics, was used as the measure of 
profitability. This is a measure of the return on owners' equity. It 
should be noted that FDIC market areas had to be used for this variable, 
rather than Census Bureau SMS As. 
The loan to deposit ratio is a measure of the existing banks' 
abilities to meet the loan needs of the community and the community's 
demand for banking services. A higji or rising loan to deposit ratio 
should have a positive impact on the expected after-tax return. This 
ratio was calculated from Table A of Bank Operating Statistics. 
The last variable is the difference between the owners' return 
on equity in manufacturing and the owners' return on equity in banking. 
The measure used for the owners' return on equity in manufacturing 
was the median return on equity of the top 500 industrial corporations 
in the United States. The median return of 12.4% was obtained from 
page 231 of the May 1974 issue of Fortune. The owners' return on 
equity in banking was described previously. One would expect entry 
into banking to be a more desirable alternative as the difference 
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becomes smaller or negative. 
It is next necessary to choose proxies for the variables that 
determine the probability of obtaining a charter. We can write: 
(22) P = f(COM-B^ , COM-B^ , COM-NB, CONC, BHC, dCOM-B^ /dt, 
dCOM-Bg/dt, dCCM-NB/dt, dCONC/dt, dBHC/dt, BB^ , BBg) 
where: COM-B^  = number of head office banks in the market, 1973 
COM-Bg = number of banking offices in the market, 1973 
COM-NB = number of savings & loan associations and 
mutual savings banks in the market, 1973 
CONC = percentage of deposits held by the largest 
bank in the market, 1973 
BHC = number of bank holding companies in the state, 
1973 
dCOM-B^ /dt = percentage change in the number of head office 
banks from 1972 to 1973 
dCON-Bg/dt = percentage change in the number of banking 
offices from 1972 to 1973 
dCOM-NB/dt = percentage change in the number of savings & 
loan associations and mutual savings banks from 
1970 to 1973 
dCONC/dt = percentage change in the percentage of deposits 
held by the largest bank from 1972 to 1973 
dBHC/dt = percentage change in the number of bank holding 
companies in the state from 1972 to 1973 
BB^  = dummy variable, = 1 for statewide branch 
banking, = 0 otherwise 
BBg = dummy variable-; = 1 for limited area branch 
banking, " 0 otherwise 
The number of independent banking alternatives in the market may 
have an impact on the probability of obtaining a charter, as might the 
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number of banking offices. One would expect a more vigorous reaction 
to entry from existing banks when there are fewer banks in the market. 
Thus the probability of obtaining a charter should be lower. Increases 
in the number of head office banks and banking offices should also 
have a negative impact on the probability of obtaining a charter, 
since any increase in the demand for banking services has already been 
partially taken care of. These data were obtained from the FDIC 
publications. Summary of Accounts and Deposits in all Commercial Banks 
and Mutual Savings Banks - National Summary, June 30, 1973 and Summary 
of Accounts and Deposits in all Commercial Banks - Regional Summaries, 
June 30, 1972. 
Nonbank financial intermediaries also offer some banking services. 
Even though they are not perfect substitutes, they do compete with 
banks in some areas. To the extent that they do compete with banks, 
a rise in the number of nonbank financial intermediaries should have 
a negative impact on the probability of obtaining a charter. This 
measure includes savings & loan associations and mutual savings banks, 
which are the major nonbank depository institutions. While it would 
have been desirable to include credit unions as well, these data were 
not available by SMSA. The data on savings & loan associations were 
obtained from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board publication, FSLIC-In-
sured Savings & Loan Associations; Combined Financial Statements. Data 
on savings & loan associations by SMSA were available only if there were 
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at least five savings & loan associations in that SMSA. Two assump­
tions were made so that these data could be used. First, three was 
arbitrarily chosen as the number of associations in the SMSA in cases 
where there were less than five. This may err on the high side. 
Second, if the area did not become an SMSA until after 1970 and had 
more than five associations in 1973, the number of associations in 
1973 minus two was used as the 1970 figure. Data on mutual savings 
banks were obtained from the FDIC publications. Summary of Accounts 
and Deposits in all ibhitual Savings Banks - National Summary, June 30, 
1970 and Summary of Accounts and Deposits in all Commercial Banks and 
Mutual Savings Banks - National Summary, June 30, 1973. The percen­
tage change variable uses 1970 data, rather than 1972 data, because 
data for 1972 were not available for mutual savings banks. 
The percentage of total deposits held by the largest bank in 
the market is a measure of the level of concentration in that market. 
The percentage change in the percentage held by the largest bank is 
a measure of the change in the level of concentration. One would ex­
pect entry to be opposed more vigorously by existing banks when the 
level of concentration is high or rising. But the chartering authori­
ties may view entry more favorably, so the sign is indeterminant. 
These data were obtained from the FDIC publications that were cited 
above. 
Bank holding company activity should have a positive impact on 
the probability of obtaining a charter. One means of expansion for 
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bank holding companies is by acquiring a charter for a new bank. It 
may be that the chartering authorities view bank holding companies 
as more stable than independent banks and thus are more willing to 
grant charters to them. Data on bank holding company activity were 
available only on a state-by-state basis and include both one-bank and 
multi-bank holding companies. These data were obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin. 
An expansion in banking services can be met either through new 
banks entering the market or througji branches of existing banks 
entering the market. One would expect more expansion to meet a rising 
demand to be met through branching when the branch banking laws are 
more liberal. Additionally, it may be that the chartering authorities 
view new branches of existing banks as less risky than new unit banks. 
If this is the case, more liberal branch banking laws should have a 
negative impact on the probability of obtaining a charter. Laws per­
mitting statewide branch banking should have a greater negative impact 
than laws permitting only limited area branching. However, since most 
limited area branching laws permit branching only in the vicinity 
of the head office, rather than only outside the vicinity, and most 
branching does occur in the vicinity of the head office bank, both 
kinds of laws should have a negative impact. 
The discriminant model that will be calculated can be written in 
the following form: 
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(23) Y = a^ lnPOP + a^ lnUEB + a^ dlnURB/dt + a^ lnRS + a^ dlnRS/dt 
+ aglnPROF + a^ dln?ROF/dt + aginDEP + a^ dlnDEP/dt + a^ l^nLD 
+ a^ d^lnLD/dt + + a^ d^lnCOM-B^ /dt + a^ l^nCOM-Bg 
+ a^ d^lnCOM-Bg/dt + a^ l^nCOM-NB + a^ ydlnCOM-NB/dt + a^ glnCONC 
+ a^ gdinCONC/dt + agglaBIlC + a^ idlnBHC/dt + a22DPKOF 
+ aggBB^ + 224882. 
Variables that are level values have been put in exponential logarithmic 
form in order to make the magnitudes of the variables comparable. The 
variable DPROF and the dummy variables, BB^  and BBg, have not been put 
in logarithmic form because zeros and negative numbers are not defined. 
To test this model, two groups were identified. In the first group 
were all SMSAs from which applications were received either by the 
state or national banking authority in 1973. The second group was 
composed of all SMSAs from which applications were not received in 
1973. There were 109 observations in the first group and 116 observa­
tions in the second group. 40 SMSAs were deleted from the sample 
because no applications were received at the national level and no 
information was available at the state level. 
D. Choosing Between National and State Charters 
The relative costs and benefits of becoming a state or a national 
bank will be assessed by the applicant. As was discussed previously, 
there are several regulatory and nonregulatory factors that must enter 
into this decision. The variables that will be used to explain the 
grouping of applicants into either the state or the national category 
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are as follows : 
(24) f (URB, SMSA, KSTCK, RR, EXAM, LAW, APPR, POP, BHC, BB^ , BBg) 
where: URB = population per square mile in 1973 
SMGA = dummy variable, = 1 for an applicant in an SMSA, 
= 0 otherwise 
KSTCK = proposed capital stock of the entering bank 
RR = dollar amount of reserves for a national bank -
dollar amount of reserves for a state bank, 1973 
EXAM = dummy variable, - 1 if state assesses exam costs, 
= 0 otherwise 
LAW = dummy variable, = 1 if state applications are 
encouraged, = 0 otherwise 
APPR = ratio of applications approved to applications 
approved and rejected by the state in 1973 minus 
the ratio of applications approved to applications 
approved and rejected by the Comptroller of the 
Currency in 1973 in that state 
POP = population per banking office in 1973 
BHC = dummy variable, = 1 if applicant would belong to a 
bank holding company, = 0 otherwise 
BB^  = dummy variable, = 1 for statewide branch banking, 
= 0 otherwise 
BB^  = dummy variable, = 1 for limited area branch banking, 
= 0 otherwise 
URB and SMSA are two ways of measuring whether or not the bank is 
in a populated area. Banks in rural areas are more dependent on the 
correspondent mechanism than are banks in urban areas. URB is one 
means of measuring the degree of urbanization. One would expect 
banks to be more likely to apply for state charters where density is 
lower. SMSA was included as another measure of whether the application 
was from a rural or an urban area. Again, an applicant is more likely 
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to join the state banking system when the bank is outside an SMSA. 
The data for URB were obtained from Rand McNally's 1973 Commercial 
Atlas and Markef-ing Guide. The data for SMSA were obtained from the 
questionnaire. 
Another nonregulatory factor is the size of the potential bank. 
Since the major advantages of national affiliation come only with large 
size, one would expect small banks to be more likely to choose state 
affiliation. The average amount of total deposits for a national 
bank in 1974 wa.3 $88.27 million, whereas it was $19.8 million for a 
state bank [5, September 1975, p. A.15]. One measure of the size of 
the applicant is its proposed initial capital stock. While this is 
not necessarily the same as the capital stock that it will have when 
it opens, it does provide a measure of the expected initial size of the 
bank. 
Reserve requirements are an important variable, particularly when 
money is tight. If state reserve requirements are lower than those set 
by che Federal Reserve, state nonmember affiliation would be more 
likely. It is assumed, since state reserve requirements are generally 
lower than national reserve requirements, that as the difference between 
the two becomes greater, state nonmember affiliation becomes more pre­
ferred. State reserve requirements were obtained from the appendix of 
an article by Robert E. Knight [22, pp. 17-20]. National reserve re­
quirements were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bulletin. An average 
size bank was then chosen, along with the dollar amounts of demand and 
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time deposits and dollar amounts of reserves were calculated on this 
basis. A more complete explanation of the calculations will be found 
in Appendix B. 
When states assess examination costs or charge an annual super­
vision fee, the state chartered bank pays fees to two regulatory 
authorities, if it is a member of the FDIC. Additionally, more on-the-
premise examinations will take place in state chartered banks, again 
because there are two authorities involved. It is probably the case 
that this cost is substantially lower to the small banks than would be 
the cost of a national charter. Only when the bank becomes a certain 
size do dual examinations and dual fee charges become onerous. Infor­
mation on examination costs and supervision fees for state banks was 
obtained from the questionnaire. 
As part of the questionnaire, state banking authorities were 
asked if the laws and regulations applying to state banks, as opposed 
to national banks, encouraged state or national affiliation or made 
little difference. The intent was to obtain some idea of the nature 
of the state laws without specifically listing a series of laws that 
might be pertinent. One would expect more national affiliation when 
the answer was little difference or encourages national affiliation, 
than if the answer was encourages state affiliation. 
The approval rate is a measure of the probability of success. 
The current approval rate is used. This assumes that information is 
transmitted to potential applicants quite rapidly. To the extent that 
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potential applicants are successfully discouraged from filing an 
application, this measure will not be uniform across all states. By 
using the difference between the state and national ratios in a 
particular state, we not only determine which approval rate is higher, 
but also the magnitude of the difference. A very slight difference 
probably has no meaning. But, a large difference may well encourage 
applicants to choose one affiliation over the other. 
Population per banking office was included as a measure of the 
size of existing banks and thus as a measure of what the size of the 
potential bank will ultimately be. Again» one would expect smaller 
banks to choose state affiliation and larger banks to choose national 
affiliation. These data were obtained from the FDIC publication 
previously cited. 
Bank holding company affiliation was included as an explanatory 
variable under the assumption that bank holding company banks will 
tend to be larger and thus choose national affiliation. These data 
were obtained from the questionnaire. 
The state branch banking laws were included under the assumption 
that banking organizations will be larger in branch banking states. 
Thus, potential entrants may expect to be larger and so will choose 
national affiliation. These data were obtained from the FDIC publica­
tion previously cited= 
The discriminant function to be calculated then is: 
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(25) Y = b inllRB + b.SMSA + b„lnKSTCK + b.RR + b.EXAM 4 b,LAW 
1 l i 4 3 0 
+ b^ APPR + bglnPOP + bgBHC + b^gBB^ + 
Again, level values, other than dummy variables, RR, and APPR, have 
been put in exponential logarithmic form in order to minimize scale 
problems. This is particularly important here, since the capital 
stock variable is much larger than the other variables. RR and APPR 
could not be put into logarithmic form since some of the observations 
on these variables are zeros or negative numbers. 
The two groups that were identified for this model were 1) appli­
cations received for national banks in 1973 and 2) applications re­
ceived for state banks in 1973. There were 89 observations in the 
first group and 217 observations in the second group. 
E. Supply of Bank Charters 
Once a charter application is submitted, the chartering authority 
makes an independent assessment of the expected value of the proposed 
bank. We are interested here in placing applications into two 
categories: 1) applications approved and 2) applications rejected. 
In order to do this, it is necessary to choose proxies for the variables 
that deîiermlna the expected value of a proposed bank. 
Beginning with market conditions, M, we can write: 
(26) M = f(POP, URB, dURB/dt, RS, dRS/dt) 
where these variables are as defined previously and the sources of the 
data are the same. As was the case for the demand model, one would 
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expect higher levels of and positive changes in these variables to 
indicate better market conditions, so applications would more likely 
be approved. 
In addition to general market conditions, the chartering authority 
will be concerned specifically with conditions in the banking industry. 
Banking conditions, B, can be represented by; 
(27) B = f(BSQ, DEP, dDEP/dt, PROF, dPROF/dt, LD, dLD/dt, COM-B , 
dCON-B^ /dt) 
The only new variable here is B3Q which represents banks per square mile 
in 1973. This variable is a measure of the density of banking services. 
The number of banking offices would have been a better measure of the 
number of banking alternatives than is the number of head office banks. 
However, data on the number of banking offices by county were not 
available for 1972. These two variables, BSQ and COM-B^  give some 
indication of the structure of the banking industry in a particular 
market. The structure is important because it may have an impact on 
the expected value calculated by the chartering authority. With fewer 
banks in a market, the negative response to the threat of entry may be 
greater. Thus higher values for these two variables should have a 
positive impact on approval, since the response will probably not be 
as organized or as concerted. 
Better banking conditions in a particular market should be re­
flected by higher levels or positive changes in deposits, the owners' 
return on equity and the loan to deposit ratio. Thus these variables 
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should be positively related to approval of applications. Positive 
changes in the number of head office banks should be negatively re­
lated to approval of applications since changes in market and banking 
conditions have already been partially offset by entry. 
The third area of concern to the chartering authority is the 
worthiness of the applicant both alone and in relationship to other 
applicants. We can write: 
(28) W = f(AFFIL, APP-K, KSTCK) 
where: W = worthiness of the applicant 
AFFIL = dummy variable, = 1 if the applicant will be a 
member of a bank holding company, = 0 otherwise 
APP-K = number of applications received in 1973 from that 
market area which had a greater proposed initial 
capital stock 
KSTCK = proposed initial capitalization of the applicant 
A member of a bank holding company has, to some extent, the rest 
of the system to fall back on if there is a problem. In addition, 
when the bank begins operations, some loan paper and deposits may 
flow to it from the rest of the system. Since the first two to three 
years of operation are the most crucial in terms of survival, these 
banks may have a greater chance of success in the eyes of the chartering 
authority. These data were obtained from the questionnaire. 
When there are several applications received from one market, the 
chartering authority must choose among them. One proxy for the quality 
of an applicant is its proposed size. A larger bank should be more 
stable and better able to satisfy the market's demands. If this is 
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true, then as the number of applicants proposing larger initial 
capitalizations then this applicant rises, the likelihood of approval 
declines. These data were also obtained from the questionnaire. 
Again, the proposed size of the bank is a proxy for the quality 
of an applicant. One would expect the proposed capitalization to be 
positively related to the likelihood of approval. These data were 
obtained from the questionnaire. 
The following discriminant function is to be calculated: 
(29) Y = c^ lnPOP + c^ lnURB + c^ dlnURB/dt + c^ lnRS + c^ dlnRS/dt 
+ CglnBSQ + c^ lnDEP + CgdlnDEP/dt + CglnPROF+c^ d^lnFROF/dt 
+ c^ l^nLD + c^ d^lnLD/dt + c^ l^nCOM-B^  + c^ d^lnCOM-B^ /dt 
+ c, AFFIL + c,,APP-K + c^lnKSTCK 
15 lb 1/ 
Again the variables other than AFFIL and APP-K were put in exponential 
logarithmic form to minimize scale problems, AFFIL is a duiwny variable 
and APP-K contains zeros on some observations, so these two variables 
were not transformed. This equation was run separately for national 
banks and then for state banks. National applications ruled on in 
1973 were divided into two groups: 1) national applications approved 
in 1973 (118 observations) and 2) national applications rejected in 
1973 (53 observations). State applications ruled on in 1973 were 
divided into the same two categories with 116 observations in the first 
and 70 observations in the second. The discriminant functions obtained 
were then compared to determine if and where differences arose 
between the national and state chartering authorities. 
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IV. PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS 
The results of the models that were tested are presented in 
the following sections. Both the t-statistic and the standardized 
discriminant weight for each variable are reported in the table. 
These are two different ways of measuring the importance of the 
variables. The t-statistic tests for differences between group 
means for a particular variable. It says nothing about the signifi­
cance of the coefficient. The standardized discriminant weight, on 
the other hand, is obtained by multiplying the within groups standard 
deviation of the variable by the coefficient for that variable in the 
discriminant function. It indicates the relative contribution of the 
variable to the discriminant function. Also reported in each table are 
two measures of the overall significance of the discriminant function, 
Rao's F-Ratio approximation and the Approximate Chi-Square, as well as 
the means for the two groups. A total correlation matrix for each 
model is presented in Appendix C. 
A. Demand for Bank Charters 
The demand for bank charters model (equation 23) was first run 
using all twenty-four variables. The results are presented in Table 
3. The coefficients on all but five variables had the expected sign. 
The Rao's F-Ratio approximation was significant at the .001 level, indi­
cating that the variables that were included successfully discriminated 
between the two groups. 
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Table 3. Demand model I 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 223 d.f. 
InPOP 0.14850 4.64814% 
InURB -0.01798 0.79133 
dlnURB/dt 0.31278 3.807843 
InRS -0.04102 6.33866* 
dlnRS/dt 0.04655 1.75659® 
InPROF -0.30512 1.65780® 
dlnPROF/dt -0.19592 0,15474 
InDEP -0.06829 5.99737a 
dlnDEP/dt 0.20364 3.20430a 
InLD 0.13837 0.27793 
dlnlD/dt 0.68363 2.89780% 
InCOM—B]_ 0.02757 7.77302a 
dlnCOM-Bi/dt 0.08590 2.49240C 
lnC0M-B2 0.19346 3.97842a 
dln/COM-Bg/dt -0.24766 1.37556f 
InCOM-NB 0.00124 4.05646a 
dlnCOM-NB/dt 0.07374 0.64401 
InCONC 0.01697 4.85708a 
dlnCONC/dt -0.02157 1.25780 
InEHC 0.02296 4.04870% 
dlnBHC/dt 0.26774 2.171024 
DPROF -0.03982 1.65155® 
BBi -0.09334 1.10636 



























Group Means: SMSAs receiving applications = 0.0013642 
SMSAs not receiving applications = -0.1589900 
Rao's F-Ratio Approximation = 6.085538^  with 24 and 200 d.f. 
Approximate Chi-Square = 115.6859^  with 24 d.f. 
S^ignificant at .001 
Significant at .005 
S^ignificant at .010 
Significant at .025 
S^ignificant at .050 
Significant at .100 
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It should be noted that the signs on the coefficients must be 
interpreted somewhat differently in discriminant analysis than they 
are in regression analysis. For example, in this case the mean on 
the group of SMSAs in which applications were received (group 1) is 
higher than the mean on the group of SMSAs in which applications were 
not received (group 2). Thus, when the sign on the coefficient is 
positive, a larger value of that variable would tend to push that 
observation into the first group. When the sign on the coefficient is 
negative, a larger value of that variable would tend to push that 
observation into the second group. 
To further illustrate this point, consider the first variable, 
InPOP. It was expected that a market area with a larger population 
per banking office would more likely receive an application for a new 
charter. That is, InPOP is positively related to the demand for bank 
charters. Since the coefficient on InPOP is positive and group 1 has 
the higher mean, we obtained the expected sign on the coefficient. 
Beginning with the variables that are proxies for the expected 
after-tax return, it was hypothesized that InPOP, InLD, dlnURB/dt, 
dlnRS/dt, dlnDEP/dt, and dlnLD/dt would be positively related to the 
expected after-tax return and thus to the demand for charters. The 
coefficients on these variables have the expected sign. Only the 
variable InPOP is in the top ten variables based on the standardized 
discriminant weight. 
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Positive relationships were also hypothesized for InURB, InRS, and 
InDEP. The coefficients on these variables do not have the expected 
sign. Both InRS and InDEP are relatively Important in terms of contri­
butions to the discriminant function. These variables will be discussed 
at greater length below. 
It was hypothesized that DPROF, the difference between the return 
on owners' equity in manufacturing and the return on owners' equity 
In banking, would be negatively related tc the demand for charters. 
The expected return in manufacturing would influence the discount rate 
that would be used by potential applicants. The coefficient obtained 
from the discriminant analysis has the expected sign and the standard­
ized discriminant weight is relatively large. 
No signs were hypothesized for the coefficients on InPROF and 
dlnPROF/dt. The results Indicate that high and rising levels of profits 
are negatively related to the demand for bank charters. Both coeffi­
cients have relatively large standardized discriminant weights. 
Turning to the variables that are proxies for the probability of 
obtaining a charter, InCOM-B^ , InCOM-Bg, InCOM-NB, InBHC, and 
dlnBHC/dt were hypothesized to be positively related to the probability 
of obtaining a charter and thus to the demand for bank charters. The 
coefficients on these variables have the expected sign. The standard­
ized discriminant weights on InCOM-B^  and InCOM-NB are small. 
It was expected that the variables dlnCOM-Bg, BB^ , and BB^  would 
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be negatively related to the demand for bank charters. All of these 
coefficients had the expected sign. All of these variables have rela­
tively large standardized discriminant weights. 
Negative relationships were hypothesized for dlnCOM-B^ /dt and 
dlnCOM-NB/dt. These coefficients do not have the expected sign. Both 
variables are relatively unimportant in terms of their contributions to 
the discriminant function. 
No a priori sign was hypothesized for InCONC and dlnCONC/dt. The 
results show a positive relationship between these variables and the 
demand for bank charters. The standardized discriminant wei^ ts are 
small. It would appear from the results that higher concentration 
ratios, InCOHC, encourage entry whereas rising concentration ratios 
discourage entry. This may indicate that potential applicants feel 
the probability of obtaining a charter is greater when there are either 
fewer banks or a few large banks in the market. Also, high and rising 
returns on owners' equity, InPROF and dlnPROF/dt, discourage entry 
rather than encouraging it. That is, when returns are high or rising, 
existing banks may be expected by potential entrants to react more 
negatively to the threat of entry, thus leading to a reduction in the 
expected after-tax return on a new bank and in the probability of ob­
taining a charter. 
The coefficients on the levels of retail sales, total deposits, 
and population per square mile do not have the expected signs. The 
signs on the coefficients indicate that applications tend to be re­
ceived from smaller and less densely populated areas. 
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Areas in which the number of head office banks and the number of 
nonbank financial intermediaries have risen also tend to receive more 
applications. Neither variable contributes substantially to the 
discriminant function. Changes in the number of banking offices is more 
important than is the number of head office banks which is to be ex­
pected. Since nonbank financial intermediaries are not perfect 
substitutes for commercial banks, changes in the number of nonbank 
financial intermediaries probably should not have much of an impact on 
the probability of obtaining a charter. 
While the coefficients on both of the dumy variables representing 
the branch banking laws have the expected sign, the standardized 
discriminant weight on the dummy variable representing limited area 
branch banking is larger than the other. This is contrary to what was 
hypothesized. However, both variables are relatively important in 
their contributions to the discriminant function. 
Several variables in this model were highly correlated. In 
patticular, InRS, InCOK-B^ , InCOM-B^ , InCOM-NB, and InDEP are all 
highly interrelated. Also highly correlated are InPRO? and DPROF, as 
well as dlnCOM-B^ /dt and dlnCOM-Bg/dt. 
Because several variables were so highly correlated, a second 
model, with fourteen variables, was run. Among the variables that were 
highly correlated in the first model, InCOM-B^ , dlnCOM-Bg/dt and DPROF 
were retained. The choice of variables to be retained was made on the 
basis of the standardized discriminant weights and expected signs of the 
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coefficients One other variable, InURB, was also eliminated because 
the standardized discriminant weight was small. The results for this 
model are presented in Table 4. Again, Rao's F-Ratio approximation 
was significant at the .001 level. In this case, the mean on the group 
of SMSAs receiving applications is more negative (smaller) than the 
mean on the group of SMSAs not receiving applications. 
It was hypothesized that InPOP, dlnURB/dt, dlnRS/dt, dlnDEP/dt, 
dlnlD/dt, InCON-Bg, InBHC, and dlnBHC/dt were positively related to 
the demand for bank charters. The coefficients on these variables 
all have the expected sign. 
Negative relationships were hypothesized for dlnCOM-Bg/dt, DPROF, 
BB^ , and BBg. All four variables have the expected sign on the 
coefficient. Again, these are the same results as those obtained 
from the first model. 
No sign was hypothesized for the coefficient on InCONC. As in 
the first model, the coefficient on InCONC indicates a positive rela­
tionship to the demand for bank charters. Again the weight indicates 
this variable is relatively unimportant. There is a change in sign on 
the coefficient on dlnCONC/dt in this model. The coefficient on 
dlnCONC/dt indicates that this variable is positively related to the 
demand for bank charters, contrary to the first model. Again the 
relative contribution of this variable is small. 
As indicated by the Rao's F-Ratio approximation, this second model 
discriminated between the two groups better than did the first model. 
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Table 4. Demand model II 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistlc 223 d.f. 
Standardized 
Discriminant WelRht 
InPOP -0.07967 4.64814* -0.45734 
dlnURB/dt -0.31157 3.80784* -0.33258 
dlnRS/dt -0.15819 1.75659® -0.26399 
dlnDEP/dt -0.27365 3.20430^  -0.33171 
dlnLD/dt -0.81810 2.89780^  -0.43581 
InCOM-Bg -0.09368 3.97842* -1.43040 
dlnCOM-B^ /dt 0.13409 1.37556^  0.29258 
InCONC -0.00137 4.85708* -0.00715 
dlnCONC/dt -0.01700 1.25780 -0.02245 
InBHC -0.02164 4.04870* -0.38971 
dlnBHC/dt -0.28785 2.17102^  -0.56932 
DPROF 0.00879 1.65155® 0.33961 
BE 0.06073 1.10636 0.39509 
BB, 0.11505 3.27587* 0.83676 
Group Means : SMSAs receiving applications = -1.3423 
SMSAs not receiving applications = -1.1819 
Rao's F-Ratio Approximation = 9.069549^  with 14 and 210 d.f. 
Approximate Chl-Square = 102.1458^  with 14 d.f. 
S^ignificant at .001 
S^ignificant at .005 
Significant at .025 
S^ignificant at .050 
Significant at .100 
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The same problems remain. The weight on the dummy variable representing 
statewide branching is smaller than the weight on the dummy variable 
representing limited area branching. However, both variables are 
relatively important. Now, the sign on the coefficient representing 
the percentage change in the level of concentration is reversed. Again, 
it could be that potential applicants expect the probability of ob­
taining a charter to be greater as the market becomes more concentrated. 
B. Choosing Between National and State Charters 
The model used to identify the variables that are particularly 
important in determining whether an applicant will choose national or 
state affiliation (equation 25) was then run. The results of this 
analysis are presented in Table 5. Again, Rao's F-Ratio approximation 
was significant at the .001 level. The mean on the group of applicants 
choosing national affiliation (group 1) was higher than the mean on 
the group of applicants choosing state affiliation. 
It was hypothesized that InURB, InKSTCK, and BHC would be posi­
tively related to national affiliation. That is, a larger value for 
the first two variables and for bank holding company affiliation 
(dummy variable = 1) would tend to push that observation into the 
group of applicants choosing national affiliation. The coefficients 
on all three of the variables have the expected sign. 
Negative relationships between APPR, RR, and LAW and national 
affiliation were expected. The coefficients on these variables have 
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Table 5. Affiliation model I 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 304 d.f. 
Standardized 
Discriminant Weight 
InURB 0.00869 2.77681^  0.22423 
SMSA -0.28252 1.38327^  -2.36870 
InKSTCK 0.73762 9.38422* 8.63070 
RR -0.15487 0.43560 -2.93660 
EXAM -0.25638 1.76466® -1.17640 
LAW -0.02008 0.17480 -0.15243 
APPR -0.40452 1.52913^  -2.45760 
InPOP -0.02875 1.56503^  -0.28712 
BHC 0.17341 0.74164 0.99952 
BB -0.20411 0.46298 -1.28690 
BB, -0.22294 0.28618 -1.79350 
Group Means: National = 9.3507 
State = 8.7620 
Rao's F-Ratio Approximation = 11. 842158* with 11 and 294 d.f. 
Approximate Chi-Square = 109.4825 * with 11 d.f. 
.Significant at .001 
.Significant at .005 
Significant at .025 
S^ignificant at .050 
Significant at . 100 
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the expected sign. The weights on the approval rate, APPR, and the 
difference between national and state reserve requirements are rela­
tively large. The weight on the dummy variable representing the 
state of the law, LAW, is smaller than that for the other variables. 
The coefficients on the rest of the variables, SMSA, EXAM, InPOP, 
and BB^  were expected to be positively related to national 
affiliation. None of the coefficients on these variables has the 
expected sign. 
The coefficients on SMSA and InPOP indicate that an applicant 
is more likely to choose national affiliation when the potential 
bank will be outside an SMSA or when it will be in an area where the 
population per banking office is smaller. In both cases, these would 
be more rural areas. This might imply that the correspondent 
mechanism is a better substitute for national affiliation when the 
respondent bank is closer to its correspondent, i.e. in an urban 
area. 
The dummy variables used to represent the assessment of examination 
costs and supervision fees and the state of the law are probably not 
particularly good variables. It would have been much better to use 
some measure of the difference in the costs for national and state 
banks of a given size in a particular state in the first case. How­
ever, those data were not available. Differences in particular laws 
would have been a better measure in the second case. 
The coefficients on both dummy variables representing the branch 
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banking laws of the states do not have the e:q>ected signs. That is, 
in areas where statewide or limited area branching is permitted, 
applicants tend to choose state affiliation. 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from these results is 
that the proposed size of the bank is of primary importance in deter­
mining whether the applicant chooses state or national affiliation. 
The only significant regulatory factors are the difference in approval 
rates between the national and state authorities for that state and 
the difference in required reserves. 
Since it was already knovm that large banks tend to be national 
banks, a second model was run without InKSTCK in an attempt to deter­
mine if this variable was acting as a proxy for other economic and 
regulatory factors. Because the only difference between some of the 
observations was the proposed initial capital stock, twenty-three 
observations had to be eliminated from the group of national applica­
tions and seventy observations from the group of state applications. 
In addition, another variable, APPR^ , was included. This variable 
is the difference in the approval rates of the two authorities in 
1972. That is, it is uhe same as APPR, but calculated with 1972 
data. APPRg is the variable APPR of the previous model. The difference 
in approval rates for 1972 was included on the assumption that 
applicants might be concerned not only with what is currently happening, 
but also with what has occurred in the near past. 
67 
As can be seen from the results presented in Table 6, this model 
does not successfully discriminate between the two groups of applicants. 
The F-Ratio was not significant at the .100 level. Again the mean on 
the group of state applications was lower than the mean on the group 
of national applications. Although the discriminating power of this 
function is poor, there are some important changes. 
Starting with the variables for which the signs on the coefficients 
did not change, InURB is positively associated with national affilia­
tion, as is BHC. The coefficients on APPR^ , APPR^ , and LAW indicate 
a negative association between these variables and national affiliation. 
As in the previous model, the weight on APPR^  is relatively large. 
The coefficient on SMSA again does not have the hypothesized sign and 
the weight is relatively low. 
Among the variables for which there were sign changes, the 
coefficients on InPOP and EXAM have the hypothesised sign and are 
significant. The coefficient on RR does not have the hypothesized 
sign and now this variable contributes least to the discriminant 
function. The coefficients on and BB^  now have the hypothesized 
signs and now the weight on BB^  is larger than the weight on BBg. 
One can conclude from these results that better measures of the 
regulatory variables are needed. Specifically, the magnitude of the 
difference in examination and supervision costs between national and 
state banks would be a desirable variable. A more detailed analysis 
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Table 6. Affiliation model II 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Standardized 211 d.f. Discriminant Weight 
InURB 0.24246 2.94428^  5.35200 
SMSA -0.16359 1.94492® -1.18310 
RR 0.03742 0.01524 0.53086 
EXAM 0.38743 1.50182^  1.60310 
LAW -0.21033 0.80221 -1.39880 
APPR^  -0.17631 0.89088 -1.43670 
APPR2 -0.65285 1.31913^  -3.56240 
InPOP 0.25301 1.71571® 1.98550 
BHC 0.27943 0.86763 1.39610 
BB^  0.31343 0.03222 1.76910 
BB2 0.14519 0.02995 1.02870 
Group Means; National = 3.9044 
State = 3.6240 
Rao's F-Ratio Approximation = 1.175816 with 11 and 201 d.f. 
Approximate Chi-Square = 12.8155 with 11 d.f. 
Significant at . 005 
S^ignificant at .050 
Significant at .100 
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of the differences in various laws and regulations applying to national 
and state banks would also be helpful. With this kind of information 
across all states, one should be better able to identify why larger 
banks tend to choose national affiliation. 
C. Supply of Bank Charters 
The entire supply model presented in equation 29 could not be run 
for either the national or the state groups. While the variables were 
not completely correlated, there was sufficient correlation, coupled 
with rounding error in the computer, so that three variables had to 
be omitted in each case. The variables that were causing the problem 
are as follows. InBSQ and InURB were highly correlated. InRS was 
highly correlated with InURB, InDEP, and InCOM-B^ . InDEP and InCOM-Bj^  
were highly correlated. Various combinations, omitting three of 
these five variables, were run. The model that was chosen omits 
InURB, InDEP, and InCOM-B^ . This combination seemed best in terms of 
overall significance, although the results were very similar among the 
combinations that were tried. 
1. National charters 
As was stated above, this model was run with the omission of 
InURB, InDEP, and InCOM-B^ . The results are presented in Table 7. 
Rao's F-Ratio approximation was .significant at the .010 level, indi-
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Table 7. National supply model 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistlc 169 d.f. 
Standardized 
Discriminant Weight 
InPOP -0.05523 0.64184 -0.49769 
dlnUSB/dt 0.55917 2.82880^  0.67209 
InRS 0.03472 1.56474^  0.81541 
dlnRS/dt 0.15070 1.69586® 0.31490 
InBSQ -0.03111 1.02303 -0.40510 
dlnDEP/dt -0.33364 0.00023 -0.34176 
InPROF -0.20730 0.71099 -0.46518 
dlnPROF/dt . 0.03567 1.06332 0.05248 
InLD -C.46773 1.20314 -0.64584 
dlnlD/dt 0.45723 0.44179 0.22176 
dlnCOM-B^ /dt -0.06516 0.53084 -0.12973 
AFFIL -0.26747 4.60885® -1.38320 
APP-K 0.01465 2.68159^  0.51278 
InKSTCK -0.00028 1.01532 -rO. 00191 




Rao's F-Ratio Approximation = 2.827877^  with 14 and 156 d.f. 
Approximate Chi-Square = 36.6389^  with 14 d.f. 
Significant at .001 
S^ignificant at .005 
[^ Significant at .010 
'Significant at .050 
Significant at .100 
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eating that the discriminant function did successfully distinguish 
between the two groups. The mean for the group of applications that 
were approved is smaller than the mean for the group of applications 
that were rejected. 
Beginning with the variables representing market and banking condi­
tions, it was hypothesized that InPOP, InESQ, dlnDEP/dt, InPROF and 
InLD would be positively related to applications approved. The 
coefficients on these variables have the expected sign. 
Positive relationships were also hypothesized for dlnURB/dt, 
InRS, dlnRS/dt, dlnPROF/dt, and dlnLD/dt. None of the coefficients 
on these variables have the expected sign. The weights on dlnURB/dt 
and InRS indicate that these variables are relatively important in 
their contributions to the discriminant function. In addition, a nega­
tive relationship between approval and dlnCOM-B^ /dt was hypothesized. 
The coefficient on this variable does not have the expected sign and 
the weight is relatively small. 
These results seem to indicate two things. First, the logs of 
the market and banking variables appear to be more important than the 
percentage changes in these variables in determining whether or not an 
application will be approved. That is, the level of market and 
banking conditions is more important that the change in market and 
banking conditions. Second, positive changes in market and banking 
conditions appear to be negatively related to approval of applications. 
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This may Indicate that existing banks oppose entry more vigorously In 
good times and that the chartering authority is sympathetic to these 
demands. 
Three variables represent the status of the applicant and the 
relationship of the applicant to other applicants. Positive relation­
ships were hypothesized between approval and AFFIL and InKSTCK. 
The coefficients on both of these variables have the expected sign. 
The weight on AFFIL is relatively large, whereas the weight on InKSTCK 
was smaller than that for any other variable. It was also hypothesized 
that APP-K would be negatively related to approval. Again, the 
coefficient has the expected sign and the weight is relatively large. 
These results support the arguments that applications for primary 
organizations from bank holding companies and applications with larger 
proposed initial capital stocks are more likely to be approved. Both 
of these results may be changing, given the current problems with 
some large bank holding company banks. 
2. State charters 
This model Is identical to the model for national charters. The 
results of the model are presented in Table 8. The discriminating 
power of this discriminant function is not as great as for the national 
model. Rao's F-Ratio approximation was significant at the .050 level, 
indicating that the discriminant function did distinguish between the 
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two groups. The mean for the group of applications that were approved 
is smaller than the mean for the group of applications that were 
rejected. 
Commencing with the variables that represent market and banking 
conditions, it was hypothesized that InPOP, InBSQ, dlnRS/Ut, dlnPROF/dt, 
and InLD would be positively related to approval. The coefficients on 
these variables have the expected sign and the weights are relatively 
large. A negative relationship between approval and dlnCOM-B^ /dt was 
hypothesized. The coefficient on dlnCOM-B^ /dt has the expected sign, 
but the weight is relatively small. 
Positive relationships were also hypothesized for dlnURB/dt, 
InRS, dlnDEP/dt, InPROF, and dlnlD/dt. None of the coefficients on 
these variables has the expected sign. The weight on InRS indicates 
that this variable is particularly important. 
The coefficients on several variables ch jiged sign between this 
model and the model for national charters. The coefficients on 
dlnRS/dt, InPROF, dlnPROF/dt, and dlnCOM-B^ /dt all have different 
signs. In both models, the weights on the logs of most of the level 
market and banking variables are greater than the weights on the 
percentage changes in those variables. There were, however, changes 
in the relative Importance of the variables. 
Turning to the variables representing the applicant, it was 
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Table 8. State supply model 
Variable Coefficient 184 d.f. 
InPOP -0.05945 1.18022 
dlnURB/dt 0.29106 1.71162® 
InRS 0.04731 0.98130 
dlnRS/dt -0.53804 0.14715 
InBSQ -0.02770 0.16444 
dlnDEP/dt 0.20016 0.52317 
InPROF 0.15854 1.69836® 
dlnPROF/dt -0.19692 1.10974 
InLD -0.50997 2.28427^  
dlnLD/dt 0.49606 0.51128 
dlnCOM-B^ /dt 0.08013 0.84868 
AFFIL -0.00414 0.45089 
APP-K 0.00046 1.88274® 

















Group Means: Applications approved = 0.008930 
Applications rejected = 0.079584 
Rao's F-Ratio Approximation = 2.043725^  with 14 and 171 d.f. 
Approximate Chi-Square = 27.3842 with 14 d.f. 
S^ignificant at .001 
Significant at .025 
S^ignificant at .050 
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hypothesized that AFFIL and InKSTCK would be positively related to 
approval. The coefficients on these variables have the expected sign. 
The importance of the coefficients, as indicated by their weights, is 
reversed from the national model. Here, the weight on InKSTCK is rela­
tively large, whereas the weight on AFFIL is not. A negative relation­
ship between approval and APP-K was hypothesized. As in the national 
model, the coefficient has the expected sign, but now the weight is 
relatively low. 
The results on the nonmarket variables indicate that state 
chartering authorities are primarily interested in the proposed size 
of the bank. An application will more likely be approved when the 
applicant proposes a larger initial capital stock. The state charter­
ing authorities do not seem particularly concerned with bank holding 
company affiliation, unlike the national chartering authority. 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, I attempted to go beyond the previous work by deal­
ing explicitly and separately with the demand for and supply of state 
and national charters and the choice between state and national affilia­
tion in a cross-sectional framework. The results of these three models 
are positive. They tend to support the argument that both market and 
regulatory variables are important in determining the demand for and 
supply of bank charters. 
Beginning with the demand model, it appears that the smaller model 
presented in Table 4 is the better model in terms of overall discrimin­
ating ability. One can conclude that, at least for 1973, both market 
and regulatory variables are important in determining whether a charter 
will be received from a particular SMSA. The market variables are those 
variables that serve as proxies for the expected after-tax return. The 
regulatory variables are those that are proxies for the probability of 
obtaining a charter. In this latter category are included both the 
attitude of the chartering authority and the response of existing banks 
to entry, which influences the chartering authority. Among the regula­
tory variables, the signs and weights on the coefficients for the level 
and rate of change in bank holding company activity support the hypothe­
sis that bank holding companies attach a higher value to the probability 
of obtaining a charter. The one surprising result here is that limited 
area branch banking laws are more important than statewide branch 
banking laws in discouraging entry. But, both are important to the 
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discriminant function. 
The model used to distinguish between national and state charter 
applications yielded Llie most interesting results. The major con­
clusion that could be drawn from the model presented in Table 5 is 
that larger banks tend to be national banks. While historically this 
has been the case, the argument was that one important incentive for 
large banks to choose national affiliation was the tax advantage 
enjoyed by national banks in their out-of-state transactions. This 
argument was no longer valid in 1973. As was noted previously. 
Congress had legislated equal tax treatment for all federally insured 
depository institutions by 1973. While the law was in a state of flux 
in 1973, i.e. changes were still being made, it was clear that the 
result would continue to be equal tax treatment for national banks 
and federally insured state banks. 
The proposed capital stock variable was omitted in the model 
presented in Table 6. This was done primarily to determine what would 
then happen to the coefficients on the other variables and because the 
weight on that coefficient was so much larger than the others. When 
that variable was eliminated, the overall discriminating power of 
the model was drastically reduced. However, the coefficients on cll 
but two of the remaining variables then had the hypothesized sign. 
It is clear that while the examination costs and approval rates, in 
particular, are important in discriminating between the two groups, 
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better measures of these variables are needed. That is, particular 
laws and costs of being either a national or a state bank need to be 
identified and incorporated in the model. 
The supply models that were proposed successfully discriminated 
between approved and rejected charters. The variables representing 
market and banking conditions gave confused results. In general, 
the logs of the level variables contributed more to the discriminant 
function than did the percentage changes in these variables. In both 
the national and state models, the signs on InPOP, InBSQ, and InLD 
were as hypothesized. la both models, the coefficients on the 
variables representing the quality of the applicant alone and in 
relation to other applicants had the hypothesized signs. In the 
national model, the number of applications from a particular market 
with larger proposed capital stocks was important in determining 
whether the applications would be approved or rejected. A major 
difference in the results between these models may be noted. The 
proposed size of the applicant is more important to state chartering 
authorities, whereas bank holding company affiliation is nwre important 
to the national chartering authority. 
It should be noted that these are cross?-sectional models based 
on data for one year, 1973. In order to determine the long-run 
validity of these models, it would be necessary to test these models 
ustng data for several years. The years should be chosen to incorporate 
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various market, banking and regulatory conditions. However, within 
the confines of this proviso, one can conclude that discriminant 
analysis can be successfully applied to a cross-sectional model 
dealing with bank charters. In addition, the results Indicate that 
the chartering authorities can control new bank entry not only 
through changes in the approval rate, but also by influencing the 
number of charters that are submitted. Thus, over time the chartering 
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VIII. APPENDIX A; REPLICA OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
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loWfl StCltC iJuiVCrSltlj of Science and Technology Ames, Iowa 50010 
Department of Economics 
Dear Sir; 
I am doing my dissertation on bank entry at Iowa State University. As part 
of this study, I want to compare the supply and demand for state bank charters 
with the supply and demand for national bank charters in 1972, 1973, and 1974. 
In particular, I want to determine which factors are most important in determining 
the number of applications that are submitted and approved and why applicants 
choose either a state or a national charter. Most of the information I need 
is available in published data, such as the IDIC's Bank Operating Statistics 
and the Census Reports. 
The most important data are those on charter applications, which are not readily 
available. In order to do this study, I need to know the counties in which 
applications for primary organizations of banks were received and approved in 
1972, 1973, and 1974. I would appreciate it if you would fill out the informa­
tion on the following pages. The back of the third page is addressed and 
stamped, for your convenience. If this information is contained in your Annual 
Reports, you could just send them to me. 
I will be using Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas data so I need to know 
the county or city from which the application was received. Under no circum-
srances will individual bank applications be identified when the dissertation 
is written. However, you could send the information as follows: County Name: 
Application 1, Application 2, etc. As I said, I need either the name of the 
county or city to identify the SMSA. 
I would appreciate it if you would return this as soon as possible. If you 
would like a copy of ny results, I would be pleased to send it to you. I will 
be finished by next summer at the latest. Thank you very much for your help. 
Sincerely, 
Coleen Pantalone 
Applicatr.oni) for new 
state charters received 
in 1972, 1973 & 1974.* 
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2. What were the initial capital stock requirements for state banks in a city 




2. Are state bank examination costs assessed to the individual bank? 
Yes 
No 
4, If examination costs are assessed to individual banks, what was the 




5. In your opinion, do the laws and regulations (for example, loan liraits) 
applying to state banks, as opposed to national banks: 
encourage applications to apply for state charters rather than 
national charters 
encourage applicants to apply for natioanl charters rather than 
state charters 
make little difference in the applicant's decision 




IX. APPENDIX B: METHOD OF CALCULATING REQUIRED RESERVES 
In order to determine the difference in national and state reserve 
requirements for each state, It was necessary to construct a balance 
sheet for an average bank and compute the dollar amount of required 
reserves on the basis of that balance sheet. An average balance sheet 
was constructed by dividing the assets and liabilities of all commercial 
banks on December 31, 1973 by the total number of banks. These data 
were obtained from pages AlB and A19 of the June 1974 Federal Reserve 
Bulletin. Required reserves, including reserves held against both 
demand deposits and time deposits, were then calculated for each state 
and for national banks. 
Since in many states United States government securities may be 
used to satisfy part of the reserve requirement, merely calculating 
required reserves would not be adequate. So, the next step was to 
calculate the amount of vault cash and "due froms" a bank would have 
to hold to satisfy the reserve requirement. That is, when United 
States government securities could be applied to part of the reserve 
requirement, these amounts were subtracted from required reserves. 
The final problem was in finding a way to handle "due from other 
banks" which count as part of required reserves for most state banks, 
but not for national banks. Since both national and state banks hold 
"due froms", the options were either to add them to national required 
reserves or subtract them from state required reserves. The second 
89 
option was chosen. Thus, the figures actually used were 1) vault cash 
plus deposits at the federal reserve banks for national banks and 
2) vault cash for state banks. For each state then, RR is the differ­
ence between 1) and 2). 
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APPENDIX C: TOTAL CORRELATION MATRICES 
Table Cl. Total correlation matrix for demand model I 
InPOP InURB dlnURB/dt InRS dlnRS/dt 
InPOP 1.00000 
InUEB -0.01596 1.00000 
dlnURB/dt 0.19278 -0.24978 1.00000 
InRS -0.06429 0,48797 0.00417 1.00000 
dlnRS/dt 0.03127 -0.37257 0.45333 -0.10506 1.00000 
InPROF 0.23753 -0.47901 0.15372 -0.28075 • 0.28058 
dlnPROF/dt 0.26721 -0.29818 0.01093 -0.20016 0.06372 
InDEP 0.06471 0.43229 0.00616 0.96783 -0.15936 
dlnDEP/dt -0,05199 -0.26277 0.29445 0.10654 0.26932 
InLD -0.29264 0.27595 -0.13082 0.33754 -0.17987 
dlnLD/dt -0.01270 0.14089 0.02977 0.24563 -0.11760 
InCOM-Bj^  0.18112 0.30118 0.01389 0.80915 -0.02622 
dlnCOM-B^ /dt -0.15588 -0.08865 0.08003 0.14093 0.47892 
InCOM-Bg -0.29612 0.49647 -0.09257 0.92287 -0.16037 
dlnCOM-Bg/dt -0.18359 -0.17249 0.15743 0.10480 0.65088 
InCOM-NB 0.09599 0.63734 -0.23115 0.79/58 -0.28464 
dlnCOM-NB/dt 0.07829 -0.05314 0.17656 -0.19384 0.27888 
InCONC -0.21872 -0.09801 -0.16882 -0.32964 -0.07695 
dlnCONC/dt 0.13240 0.18224 -0.15025 -0.08753 -0.50011 
InBHC 0.54364 -0.01802 0.10618 -0.00359 0.03957 
dlnBHC/dt 0.14455 0.17181 -0.02155 -0.10311 0.16948 
DPROF -0.25573 0.47893 -0.16101 0.29751 -0.27679 
B6 -0.28243 0.00446 0.11750 0.12811 0.01109 
BB, -0.34963 0.27010 -0.31338 -0.01911 -0.15659 
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InPROF dlnPROF/dt InDEP dlnDEP/dt InLD dlnLD/dt InCOMB^  
1.00000 
0.60864 1. 00000 
-0.21670 -0. 13302 1. 00000 
0.17321 0. 02745 0. 13646 1.00000 
-0.55586 -0. 36662 0. 29022 -0.02555 1. 00000 
-0.13159 -0. 10267 0. 25931 0.01323 0. 27872 1.00000 
-0.04838 -0. 01257 0. 80864 0.16505 0. 12031 0.22621 1. 00000 
0.03683 -0. 06328 0. 10682 0.38581 0. 06749 0.11765 0. 24220 
-0.36606 -0. 30164 0. 89076 0.08305 0. 44010 0.22134 0. 68869 
0.08298 -0. 00555 0. 05948 0.41613 0. 04775 0.00992 0. 20134 
-0.26663 -0. 14463 0. 76324 -0.05095 0. 25247 0.13142 0. 66591 
0.07951 0. 13612 -0.20438 0.13325 -0. 16573 -0.04519 -0. 12705 
-0.16572 -0. 10896 -0. 31936 -0.17722 0. 25101 -0.12094 -0. 60553 
-0.09260 -0. 08810 -0, 06967 -0.29380 0. 07075 0.02734 -0. 22716 
0.17131 0. 27891 0. 02847 0.00581 -0. 32960 0.06671 0. 27525 
0.17869 0. 13988 -0. 13879 0.04133 -0. 21525 -0.13635 -0. 05378 
-0.99239 -0. 59423 0. 23233 -0.16903 0. 55878 0.14111 0. 07936 
-0.41811 -0. 33229 0. 05481 0.00865 0. 38216 0.01489 -0. 14661 
-0.02214 -0. 05967 —0. 00619 -0.12091 0. 11708 0 . 037 4 6 -0. 12024 
Table Cl (Continued) 













dlnCOM-B^ /dt 1.00000 
InCOM-Bg 0.15996 1. 00000 
dlnCOM-B^ /dt 0.69933 0. 12988 1.00000 
InCOM-NB -0.01083 0. 73338 -0.05962 1.00000 
dlnCOM-NB/dt 0.13998 -0. 24192 0.12629 -0.10468 1. 00000 
InCONC -0.04618 -0. 21447 -0.10598 -0.27247 -0. 04339 
dlnCONC/dt -0.48689 -0. 09772 -0.61705 0.04594 -0. 03511 
InBHC -0.02240 -0. 22400 -0.03500 0.02074 0. 01124 
dlnBHC/dt 0.14737 -0. 16730 0.13436 -0.00178 0. 25109 
DPROF -0.02217 0. 38518 -0.07002 0.28085 -0.06831 
BBi -0.02474 0. 23171 -0.03696 -0.03299 -0. 04049 
BB_ 0.04726 0. 13622 -0.02637 0.11509 -0. 05314 
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Table C2. Total correlation matrix for demand model II 
InPOP dlnUR3/dt dlnRS/dt dlnDEP/dt dlnLD/dt InCOM-B^  
InPOP 1. 00000 
dlnURB/dt 0. 19278 1.00000 
dlnRS/dt 0. 03127 0.45333 1.00000 
dlnDEP/dt -0. 05199 0.29445 0.26932 1= 00000 
dlnLD/dt -0. 01270 0.02977 -0.11760 0. 01323 1. 00000 
InCOM-B^  -0. 29612 -0.09257 -0.16037 0. 08305 0. 22134 1. 00000 
dlnCOM-B^ /dt -0. 18359 0.15743 0.65088 0. 41613 0. 00992 0. 12988 
InCONC -0. 21872 -0.16882 -0.07695 -0. 17722 -0. 12094 -0. 21447 
dlnCONC/dt -0. 13240 -0.15025 -0.50011 -0. 29380 0. 02734 -0. 097 72 
InBHC 0, 54364 0.10618 0.03957 0. 00581 0. 06671 -0. 22400 
ùiûBHC/dt 0. 14455 -0.02155 0.16948 0. 04133 -0. 13635 -0. 16 730 
DPROF -0. 25573 -0.16101 -0.27679 -0. 16903 0. 14111 0. 38518 
BB^  -0. 28243 0.11750 0.01109 0. 00865 0. 01489 0. 23171 
BB2 -0. 34963 -0.31338 -0.15659 -0. 12091 0. 03746 0. 13622 
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dlnCOM-B^ /dt InCONC dlnCONC/dt InBHC dlnBHC/dt DPkOF BB^  BB^  
1.00000 
-0.10598 1. 00000 
-0.61705 0. 27252 1. 00000 
-0.03500 -0. 36592 -0. 09420 1,00000 
0.13436 0. 00244 -0. 02883 0.22034 
-0.07002 0. 13479 0. 07814 -0.16954 
-0.03696 0. 27821 0. 11349 -0.61301 
-0.02Ô37 0. 13420 -0. 00677 0.01039 
1.00000 
-0.17682 1.00000 
-0.29953 0.40433 1.00000 
0.18302 0.03069 -0.51632 1.00000 
Table C3. Total correlation matrix for affiliation model I 















































































Table C4. Total correlation matrix for affiliation model II 












































































-0.05719 -0.37086 1.00000 
Table C5. Total correlation matrix for national supply model 
InPOP dlnURB/dt InRS dlnRS/dt InESQ dlnDEP/dt 
InPOP 1.00000 
dlnURB/dt -0.33419 1. 00000 
liiRS 0.52479 -0. 14408 1. 00000 
dlnRS/dt -0.28290 0. 48572 -0. 12756 1.00000 
InBSQ 0.18612 -0. 08723 0. 68277 -0.21902 1. 00000 
dlnDEP/dt -0.20150 0. 37079 -0. 16495 0.30402 -0.22065 1. 00000 
InPROF -0.51191 0. 40344 -0. 40563 0.35325 -0. 33830 0.31170 
dlnPROF/dt -0.48070 0. 28884 -0.23021 0.19864 -0. 16407 0. 11255 
InLD 0.30363 -0. 43268 0. 37901 -0.25417 0. 11041 -0. 17299 
dlnLD/dt 0.19632 -0. 03564 0. 11953 -0.12934 0. 16399 -0. 03092 
dlnCOM-B^ /dt 0.13166 0. 00599 0. 24760 0.04607 0. 15139 0. 38917 
AFFIL -0.10883 -0. 01747 -0. 14696 0.06078 -0. 08451 -0. 04778 
APP-K -0.06371 0. 09297 0. 39561 0.06054 0. 25555 -0. 09575 
InKSTCK 0.45720 -0. 06713 0. 35098 -0.10269 0. 29313 -0. 07880 
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InPROF dlnPROF/dt InLD dlzLD/dt dlnCOM-Bj/dt AFFIL APP-K InKSTCK 
1.00000 
0.61857 1.00000 
-0.47297 -0.22587 1.00000 
-0.19424 -0.05642 0.29998 1.00000 
-0.14968 -0.16708 0.14751 0.17999 
-0.02339 -0.0L627 -0.04420 -0.120:3 
0.04282 0.19583 0.21160 -0.00935 










Table C6. Total correlation matrix for state supply model 
InPOP dlnURB/dt InRS dlnRS/dt InBSQ dlnDEP/dt 
InPOP 1.00000 
dlnURB/dt 0.13691 1.00000 
]nRS 0.65837 0.22853 1.00000 
dlnRS/dt 0.09999 0.46707 0.04789 1.00000 
InBSQ 0.20010 0.01876 0.66964 -0.19167 1.00000 
dlnDEP/dt -0.05714 0.. 27142 -0.11027 0.42651 -0.30808 1.00000 
InPROF -0.26176 0.09175 -0.39886 0.16494 -0.51466 0.27442 
dlnPROF/dt -0.32171 -0.00713 -0.22535 -0.03337 -0.24465 0.08501 
luLD 0.34673 0.01185 0.50261 -0.04032 0.40230 0.00456 
dlnLD/dt 0.25170 -0.08317 0.22663 -0.23201 0.24146 -0.16888 
dlnCOM-B^ /dt 0.10455 0.22543 0.31800 0.43362 0.18127 0.26181 
AFFIL -0.21370 -0.11017 0.00452 -J.24558 0.18388 -0.06690 
APP-K 0.07760 0.29484 \ 45492 0.13364 0.29146 0.04243 
InKSTCK 0.51976 -0.08749 0.23653 -0.01715 0.12877 -0.01824 
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InPROF dlnPROF/dt InLD dlnLD/dt dlnCOM-B^ /dt AFFIL APP-K InKSTCK 
1.00000 
0.56842 1.00000 
-0.44422 -û.30315 
-0.17533 -0.05239 
-0.10100 -0.13200 
-0.21533 -0.03096 
-0.03280 0.00233 
-0.25035 -0.26517 
1.00000 
0.46240 1.00000 
0.18319 0.18421 
0.C5001 -0.08145 
0.19658 -0.09623 
0.39192 0.26388 
1.00000 
-0.06459 1.00000 
0.05326 -0.06289 
0,13964 -0.25030 
1.00000 
-0.22762 1.00000 
